🔒 TEE-TA 脆弱性解析レポート

Based on the provided Trusted Application C code snippet, we can analyze the taint data flow originating from the `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` function. The taint source is the `cmd` parameter, which is used to determine which command to execute. The `params` array is marked as the taint label, indicating that it may contain tainted data that flows through the application.

Here are the data flows extracted from the code:

1. **Taint Source**:
   - `cmd` (tainted input from the caller)

2. **Data Flow Analysis**:
   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Tainted Data Flow: 
       - `cmd` → `read_persist_value(pt, params)`
       - `params` is passed to `read_persist_value`, potentially carrying tainted data.

   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Tainted Data Flow:
       - `cmd` → `write_persist_value(pt, params)`
       - `params` is passed to `write_persist_value`, potentially carrying tainted data.

   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Tainted Data Flow:
       - `cmd` → `delete_persist_value(pt, params)`
       - `params` is passed to `delete_persist_value`, potentially carrying tainted data.

3. **Default Case**:
   - If `cmd` does not match any of the defined cases, it logs an error message and returns `TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`. There is no taint propagation in this case since no further operations are performed.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows:
- `cmd` → `read_persist_value(pt, params)` (Tainted data flow for read command)
- `cmd` → `write_persist_value(pt, params)` (Tainted data flow for write command)
- `cmd` → `delete_persist_value(pt, params)` (Tainted data flow for delete command)

In all cases, the `params` array is a potential sink for tainted data, as it is passed to the respective functions that may operate on it. The actual handling of the tainted data would depend on the implementations of `read_persist_value`, `write_persist_value`, and `delete_persist_value`, which are not provided in the snippet.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `write_persist_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, which is the `params` parameter, and analyze the data flow, data aliases, and tainted data operations.

### Taint Source:
- **New Taint Source**: `write_persist_value` function is invoked with `params` marked as a taint label.

### Data Flow Analysis:
1. **Parameter Validation**:
   - The function checks if `pt` matches the expected parameter types (`exp_pt`). If not, it returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This does not propagate taint but ensures that the function is called with the correct parameters.

2. **Extracting Tainted Data**:
   - `name_buf = params[0].memref.buffer;`
     - `name_buf` is now a direct alias of `params[0].memref.buffer`, which is tainted.
   - `name_buf_sz = params[0].memref.size;`
     - `name_buf_sz` is derived from the size of the tainted buffer.

3. **Validation of Tainted Data**:
   - `check_valid_value(name_buf)` is called with `name_buf`, which is tainted. If this check fails, an error message is logged, and the function returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This operation does not alter the taint but validates it.

4. **Overwrite Logic**:
   - The function checks if `name_buf` starts with a vendor prefix or a rollback protection string. If it does, the `overwrite` flag is set to `false`. This logic does not alter the taint but controls subsequent operations based on the tainted data.

5. **Memory Allocation for Value**:
   - `value_sz = params[1].memref.size;`
     - `value_sz` is derived from the size of the second tainted buffer.
   - `value = TEE_Malloc(value_sz, 0);`
     - Memory is allocated for `value`, which will hold the tainted data from `params[1].memref.buffer`.

6. **Copying Tainted Data**:
   - `TEE_MemMove(value, params[1].memref.buffer, value_sz);`
     - The tainted data from `params[1].memref.buffer` is copied to `value`, which is now also tainted.

7. **Conditional Logic Based on Tainted Data**:
   - The function checks if `name_buf` starts with the vendor prefix and whether vendor creation is enabled. If not, it sets `res` to `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS` and logs an error. This does not alter the taint but controls the flow based on tainted data.
   - If `name_buf` does not match the boot firmware version, it calls `write_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, overwrite);`, propagating the taint from `name_buf` and `value` to this function.
   - If it matches the boot firmware version, it calls `increase_boot_firmware(value, value_sz);`, again propagating the taint from `value`.

8. **Memory Deallocation**:
   - `TEE_Free(value);`
     - The allocated memory for `value` is freed, which does not affect the taint but cleans up resources.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows:
- `params[0].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `name_buf` (tainted)
- `params[1].memref.size` (tainted) → `value_sz` (tainted)
- `params[1].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `value` (tainted)
- `name_buf` (tainted) → `check_valid_value(name_buf)` (validation)
- `name_buf`, `name_buf_sz`, `value`, `value_sz` (tainted) → `write_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, overwrite)` (tainted operation)
- `value` (tainted) → `increase_boot_firmware(value, value_sz)` (tainted operation)

### Conclusion:
The `write_persist_value` function processes tainted data from the `params` parameter, validating and potentially modifying it based on certain conditions. The taint is propagated through various operations, particularly when calling other functions that handle the tainted data. The analysis highlights the importance of ensuring that the tainted data is handled securely throughout the function.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `increase_boot_firmware` function, we will identify the new taint source, which is the `new_ver_str` parameter, and analyze the data flow, data aliases, and tainted data operations.

### Taint Source:
- **New Taint Source**: `increase_boot_firmware` function is invoked with `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` marked as taint labels.

### Data Flow Analysis:
1. **Parameters**:
   - `new_ver_str` is a pointer to a character array (string) that is expected to contain the new boot firmware version. It is tainted as it originates from the `value` variable in the `write_persist_value` function.
   - `new_ver_sz` is the size of the new version string, which is also tainted as it is derived from `params[1].memref.size`.

2. **Rollback Protection Check**:
   - The function first checks if the system is rollback protected by calling `is_rollback_protected()`. This function does not affect the taint but determines whether the subsequent checks should be performed.
   - It then checks if the new version string is incremental by calling `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)`. This function takes the tainted `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` as inputs. If the version is not incremental and rollback protection is enabled, an error message is logged, and the function returns `TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED`. This operation does not alter the taint but validates it.

3. **Writing the New Version**:
   - If the checks pass, the function calls `write_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, new_ver_str, new_ver_sz, true);`.
     - `BOOTFIRM_VER` is a constant representing the key for the boot firmware version.
     - `strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1` calculates the size of the key, which is not tainted.
     - `new_ver_str` (tainted) and `new_ver_sz` (tainted) are passed to `write_value`, propagating the taint to this function.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows:
- `new_ver_str` (tainted) → `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)` (tainted operation)
- `new_ver_sz` (tainted) → `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)` (tainted operation)
- If checks pass, `new_ver_str` (tainted) and `new_ver_sz` (tainted) → `write_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, new_ver_str, new_ver_sz, true)` (tainted operation)

### Conclusion:
The `increase_boot_firmware` function processes tainted data from the `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` parameters. It performs validation checks to ensure that the firmware version update complies with rollback protection rules. If the checks are passed, it propagates the taint to the `write_value` function, which will handle the actual writing of the new firmware version. The analysis emphasizes the importance of validating tainted data before performing operations that could affect system integrity.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `is_rollback_protected` function, we will identify the new taint source, which is the result of the `read_value` function, and analyze the data flow, data aliases, and tainted data operations.

### Taint Source:
- **New Taint Source**: The `is_rollback_protected` function itself does not take any parameters, but it interacts with the `read_value` function, which is a potential source of tainted data.

### Data Flow Analysis:
1. **Local Variables**:
   - `value_sz` is initialized to `MAX_SIMPLE_VALUE_SIZE`, which is a constant and not tainted.
   - `value` is a character array of size `MAX_SIMPLE_VALUE_SIZE`, which is also not tainted at this point.
   - `count` is a `uint32_t` variable that will hold the count of values read, and it is not tainted.

2. **Reading Rollback Protection Value**:
   - The function calls `read_value(ROLLBACK_PROT, strlen(ROLLBACK_PROT) + 1, value, value_sz, &count);`.
     - `ROLLBACK_PROT` is a constant representing the key for rollback protection. It is not tainted.
     - `strlen(ROLLBACK_PROT) + 1` calculates the size of the key, which is also not tainted.
     - `value` is the buffer where the result of the read operation will be stored. While `value` itself is not tainted at this point, it will be populated with data from the `read_value` function, which may contain tainted data depending on the implementation of `read_value`.
     - `value_sz` is the size of the buffer, which is not tainted.
     - `&count` is a pointer to a variable that will hold the number of items read, which is also not tainted.

3. **Checking the Result**:
   - After the call to `read_value`, the function checks if `res` is equal to `TEE_SUCCESS`. If it is, it logs a message indicating that rollback protection is enabled and returns `true`. This operation does not alter the taint but indicates that the rollback protection is active.
   - If `res` is not `TEE_SUCCESS`, the function returns `false`, indicating that rollback protection is not enabled.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows:
- The `read_value` function is called with parameters that are not tainted, but the data read into `value` could potentially be tainted depending on the implementation of `read_value`.
- The outcome of `read_value` (i.e., whether it succeeds or fails) determines the return value of `is_rollback_protected`, but it does not propagate any taint directly.

### Conclusion:
The `is_rollback_protected` function checks for rollback protection by reading a value associated with the `ROLLBACK_PROT` key. While the function itself does not directly handle tainted data, it relies on the `read_value` function, which may interact with tainted data depending on its implementation. The analysis highlights the importance of understanding how data is read and validated, especially when it can affect security features like rollback protection. The taint analysis for this function is limited because it does not directly manipulate tainted data but relies on the behavior of `read_value`.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `read_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, which is the `name` and `value` parameters, and analyze the data flow, data aliases, and tainted data operations.

### Taint Source:
- **New Taint Source**: The `read_value` function takes `name`, `name_sz`, `value`, `value_sz`, and `count` as parameters, where `name` and `value` are marked as taint labels.

### Data Flow Analysis:
1. **Parameters**:
   - `name` (tainted): A pointer to a character array that represents the name of the object to read.
   - `name_sz` (not tainted): The size of the name.
   - `value` (tainted): A pointer to a character array where the read data will be stored.
   - `value_sz` (not tainted): The size of the buffer where data will be read.
   - `count` (not tainted): A pointer to a variable that will hold the number of bytes read.

2. **Getting the Full Object Name**:
   - The function calls `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz);`.
     - `name` (tainted) is passed to this function, which may manipulate or validate the tainted data.
     - `name_full` is a local buffer that will hold the full name of the object, and `name_full_sz` will hold its size.
     - If `get_named_object_name` returns an error, the function returns that error code. This operation does not alter the taint but may affect how the tainted data is used.

3. **Opening the Persistent Object**:
   - The function calls `TEE_OpenPersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, &h);`.
     - `name_full` is not tainted, but it is derived from the potentially tainted `name`.
     - If this call fails, an error message is logged, and the function returns the error code. This operation does not alter the taint but indicates that the object could not be opened.

4. **Reading Object Data**:
   - The function calls `TEE_ReadObjectData(h, value, value_sz, count);`.
     - `value` (tainted) is the buffer where the data will be read into.
     - `value_sz` (not tainted) is the size of the buffer.
     - `count` (not tainted) is a pointer to a variable that will hold the number of bytes read.
     - If this call fails, an error message is logged, and the function returns the error code. This operation propagates the taint from `value` since it is the destination for the read data.

5. **Closing the Object**:
   - The function calls `TEE_CloseObject(h);` to close the handle to the persistent object. This operation does not affect the taint.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows:
- `name` (tainted) → `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)` (tainted operation)
- `name_full` (not tainted, derived from tainted `name`) → `TEE_OpenPersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, &h)` (tainted operation)
- `value` (tainted) → `TEE_ReadObjectData(h, value, value_sz, count)` (tainted operation)
- `value` is populated with potentially tainted data from the persistent object.

### Conclusion:
The `read_value` function processes tainted data from the `name` and `value` parameters. It attempts to read data associated with a named object and stores the result in the `value` buffer. The taint is propagated through the function, particularly when reading data into the `value` buffer. The analysis emphasizes the importance of ensuring that the data read from persistent storage is handled securely, as it may contain sensitive information. The function also relies on the behavior of `get_named_object_name` and `TEE_OpenPersistentObject`, which may affect how the tainted data is processed.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `get_named_object_name` function, we will identify the new taint source, which is the `name_orig` parameter, and analyze the data flow, data aliases, and tainted data operations.

### Taint Source:
- **New Taint Source**: The `get_named_object_name` function takes `name_orig` and `name_orig_size` as parameters, where `name_orig` is marked as a taint label.

### Data Flow Analysis:
1. **Parameters**:
   - `name_orig` (tainted): A pointer to a character array that represents the original name of the object.
   - `name_orig_size` (not tainted): The size of the original name.
   - `name` (not tainted initially): A pointer to a character array where the full object name will be constructed.
   - `name_size` (not tainted): A pointer to a variable that will hold the size of the constructed name.

2. **Prefix Length Calculation**:
   - `size_t pref_len = strlen(named_value_prefix);`
     - `pref_len` holds the length of the `named_value_prefix`, which is a constant and not tainted.

3. **Parameter Validation**:
   - The function checks if the combined size of `name_orig_size` and `pref_len` exceeds `TEE_OBJECT_ID_MAX_LEN`. If it does, the function returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This operation does not alter the taint but ensures that the parameters are valid.

4. **Constructing the Full Object Name**:
   - `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len);`
     - This copies the prefix into the `name` buffer. The `name` buffer is not tainted at this point, as it is being initialized with a constant value.
   - `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size);`
     - This concatenates the original name (`name_orig`, which is tainted) to the end of the prefix in the `name` buffer. After this operation, the `name` buffer contains tainted data because it now includes the tainted `name_orig`.

5. **Setting the Name Size**:
   - `*name_size = name_orig_size + pref_len;`
     - This sets the size of the constructed name, which is not tainted.

6. **Return Value**:
   - The function returns `TEE_SUCCESS`, indicating that the operation was successful. This does not affect the taint.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows:
- `name_orig` (tainted) → `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)` (tainted operation)
- After the second `TEE_MemMove`, `name` contains tainted data because it now includes the tainted `name_orig`.

### Conclusion:
The `get_named_object_name` function processes tainted data from the `name_orig` parameter. It constructs a full object name by concatenating a constant prefix with the original name. The taint is propagated to the `name` buffer, which now contains potentially tainted data after the concatenation. The analysis highlights the importance of ensuring that the constructed name is handled securely, as it may be used in subsequent operations that interact with persistent storage or other sensitive components. The function itself does not perform any operations that would alter the taint but relies on the integrity of the input data.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `strlen` function, we will analyze how it interacts with tainted data, specifically focusing on the `arg1` parameter, which is marked as a taint label.

### Taint Source:
- **New Taint Source**: The `strlen` function takes a single parameter, `arg1`, which is marked as a taint label. This parameter is expected to be a pointer to a null-terminated string.

### Data Flow Analysis:
1. **Parameter**:
   - `arg1` (tainted): A pointer to a character array (string) whose length is to be calculated. This string may contain tainted data, depending on its origin.

2. **Function Behavior**:
   - The `strlen` function calculates the length of the string pointed to by `arg1` by iterating through the characters until it encounters a null terminator (`'\0'`). 
   - The function does not modify the contents of the string; it only reads the data to determine the length.

3. **Taint Propagation**:
   - The output of `strlen(arg1)` is the length of the string, which is an integer value. While the length itself is not tainted, it is derived from potentially tainted data. Therefore, any subsequent operations that use this length to access or manipulate data could be affected by the taint.
   - For example, if the length is used to allocate memory or copy data, the integrity of those operations could be compromised if the original string (`arg1`) is tainted.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows:
- `arg1` (tainted) → `strlen(arg1)` (tainted operation)
- The result of `strlen(arg1)` is the length of the string, which is not tainted, but it is derived from tainted data.

### Conclusion:
The `strlen` function processes tainted data from the `arg1` parameter. While it does not modify the data, it relies on the integrity of the input string to calculate its length. The taint is not directly propagated to the output of `strlen`, but any subsequent operations that use the length could be affected by the taint present in the original string. This analysis emphasizes the importance of ensuring that the data passed to functions like `strlen` is validated and sanitized, especially when it may influence further operations in a security-sensitive context.

Based on the provided Trusted Application C code snippet, we can analyze the data flow with respect to the taint source and the taint label. The taint source is the `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` function, specifically the parameters `cmd`, `pt`, and `params`. The taint label is associated with the `params` parameter, which is an array of `TEE_Param` structures.

Here’s the breakdown of the data flows:

1. **Taint Source**: 
   - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` is invoked with parameters: `cmd`, `pt`, and `params`.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The `params` array is marked as tainted data. This means that any operations that involve `params` will propagate the taint.

3. **Data Flow Analysis**:
   - The `cmd` parameter is used in a switch statement to determine which command to execute. The commands are:
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE`
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE`
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE`
   - Each case calls a function that takes `pt` and `params` as arguments, which means the taint from `params` will flow into these functions.

4. **Function Calls**:
   - **Case 1**: `TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE`
     - Calls `read_persist_value(pt, params)`.
     - Tainted data flow: `params` (tainted) → `read_persist_value` function.
   - **Case 2**: `TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE`
     - Calls `write_persist_value(pt, params)`.
     - Tainted data flow: `params` (tainted) → `write_persist_value` function.
   - **Case 3**: `TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE`
     - Calls `delete_persist_value(pt, params)`.
     - Tainted data flow: `params` (tainted) → `delete_persist_value` function.

5. **Default Case**:
   - If `cmd` does not match any of the defined cases, it logs an error and returns `TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`. There is no taint propagation in this case since no functions are called.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- **Taint Flow 1**: 
  - `params` (tainted) → `read_persist_value(pt, params)`
  
- **Taint Flow 2**: 
  - `params` (tainted) → `write_persist_value(pt, params)`

- **Taint Flow 3**: 
  - `params` (tainted) → `delete_persist_value(pt, params)`

In conclusion, the taint from the `params` parameter flows into the respective command handling functions, potentially affecting their behavior based on the tainted data.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `write_persist_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The taint source is now the `write_persist_value` function, and the taint label remains the `params` parameter.

### Taint Analysis Breakdown

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The function `write_persist_value` is invoked with parameters: `pt` and `params`.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The `params` parameter is marked as tainted, which means any operations involving `params` will propagate the taint.

3. **Data Flow Analysis**:
   - The function begins by checking if `pt` matches the expected parameter types (`exp_pt`). If not, it returns an error without further processing, so no taint propagation occurs in this case.

4. **Data Aliases**:
   - `name_buf` is assigned from `params[0].memref.buffer`, which is tainted.
   - `name_buf_sz` is assigned from `params[0].memref.size`, which is also tainted.
   - `value` is allocated memory based on `params[1].memref.size`, which is tainted.
   - `value` is then populated with data from `params[1].memref.buffer`, which is tainted.

5. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The function checks the validity of `name_buf` using `check_valid_value(name_buf)`. Since `name_buf` is tainted, this function operates on tainted data.
   - The `value` variable is allocated and populated with data from `params[1].memref.buffer`, which is tainted. This means that any operations on `value` will also be tainted.
   - The function checks conditions based on the contents of `name_buf` and potentially modifies the behavior of the function based on the tainted data.

6. **Function Calls**:
   - The function calls `write_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, overwrite)` if certain conditions are met. Since `name_buf`, `name_buf_sz`, `value`, and `value_sz` are all derived from tainted data, this function call operates on tainted data.
   - If the condition for handling the boot firmware version is met, it calls `increase_boot_firmware(value, value_sz)`, which also operates on tainted data.

7. **Memory Management**:
   - The allocated `value` is freed at the end of the function, but this does not affect the taint analysis.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- **Taint Flow 1**: 
  - `params[0].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `name_buf` (tainted)
  
- **Taint Flow 2**: 
  - `params[0].memref.size` (tainted) → `name_buf_sz` (tainted)

- **Taint Flow 3**: 
  - `params[1].memref.size` (tainted) → `value_sz` (tainted)

- **Taint Flow 4**: 
  - `params[1].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `value` (tainted)

- **Taint Flow 5**: 
  - `name_buf` (tainted) → `check_valid_value(name_buf)` (tainted operation)

- **Taint Flow 6**: 
  - `name_buf`, `name_buf_sz`, `value`, `value_sz` (all tainted) → `write_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, overwrite)` (tainted operation)

- **Taint Flow 7**: 
  - `value`, `value_sz` (tainted) → `increase_boot_firmware(value, value_sz)` (tainted operation)

### Conclusion
The `write_persist_value` function processes tainted data from the `params` parameter, and this taint propagates through various operations and function calls. The function's behavior can be influenced by the tainted data, which may lead to security implications if not properly validated or sanitized.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `increase_boot_firmware` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The taint source is now the `increase_boot_firmware` function, and the taint label remains the `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` parameters.

### Taint Analysis Breakdown

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The function `increase_boot_firmware` is invoked with parameters: `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz`.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The parameters `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` are marked as tainted, which means any operations involving these parameters will propagate the taint.

3. **Data Flow Analysis**:
   - The function first checks if the system is rollback protected by calling `is_rollback_protected()`. This function does not operate on tainted data, so it does not affect the taint flow.
   - The function then checks if the new version string is incremental by calling `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)`. Since `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` are tainted, this function operates on tainted data.

4. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - If the conditions in the `if` statement are met (i.e., rollback protection is active and the version is not incremental), the function logs an error message and returns `TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED`. This does not propagate taint further.
   - If the conditions are not met, the function calls `write_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, new_ver_str, new_ver_sz, true)`. Here, `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` are tainted, which means this function call operates on tainted data.

5. **Function Calls**:
   - The call to `write_value` uses `BOOTFIRM_VER`, which is a constant string, and `strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1`, which is not tainted. However, since `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` are tainted, the `write_value` function will also operate on tainted data.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- **Taint Flow 1**: 
  - `new_ver_str` (tainted) → `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)` (tainted operation)

- **Taint Flow 2**: 
  - `new_ver_sz` (tainted) → `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)` (tainted operation)

- **Taint Flow 3**: 
  - `new_ver_str`, `new_ver_sz` (tainted) → `write_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, new_ver_str, new_ver_sz, true)` (tainted operation)

### Conclusion
The `increase_boot_firmware` function processes tainted data from the `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` parameters. The taint propagates through the function, particularly affecting the call to `is_version_incremental` and `write_value`. The function's behavior can be influenced by the tainted data, which may lead to security implications if not properly validated or sanitized. The checks for rollback protection and version incrementality are crucial for maintaining the integrity of the firmware update process.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `is_version_incremental` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The taint source is now the `is_version_incremental` function, and the taint label remains the `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` parameters.

### Taint Analysis Breakdown

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The function `is_version_incremental` is invoked with parameters: `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz`.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The parameters `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` are marked as tainted, which means any operations involving these parameters will propagate the taint.

3. **Data Flow Analysis**:
   - The function begins by declaring a variable `value` to hold the current firmware version and a variable `count` to hold the number of items read.
   - It calls `read_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, value, MAX_SIMPLE_VALUE_SIZE, &count)`. The result of this call is stored in `res`. The `BOOTFIRM_VER` is a constant string, and `strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1` is not tainted. However, the `value` buffer will be populated based on the result of this function call.

4. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - If `res` equals `TEE_ERROR_ITEM_NOT_FOUND`, it logs a message and returns `true`. This does not propagate taint further.
   - If `res` equals `TEE_SUCCESS`, it converts the `value` (current firmware version) from a string to an unsigned long using `strtoul(value, NULL, 10)`. Since `value` is populated from the `read_value` function, it is not tainted by `new_ver_str` or `new_ver_sz`.
   - It then converts `new_ver_str` to an unsigned long using `strtoul(new_ver_str, NULL, 10)`. Since `new_ver_str` is tainted, this operation is also tainted.

5. **Comparison**:
   - The function logs the current and new version numbers. The comparison `if (new_ver >= current_ver)` checks if the new version is greater than or equal to the current version. Since `new_ver` is derived from tainted data, this operation is tainted.

6. **Return Value**:
   - If the new version is greater than or equal to the current version, it returns `true`. Otherwise, it returns `false`. The return value itself does not propagate taint but indicates the result of the tainted comparison.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- **Taint Flow 1**: 
  - `new_ver_str` (tainted) → `strtoul(new_ver_str, NULL, 10)` (tainted operation)

- **Taint Flow 2**: 
  - `value` (not tainted) → `strtoul(value, NULL, 10)` (not tainted operation)

- **Taint Flow 3**: 
  - `new_ver` (tainted) and `current_ver` (not tainted) → `if (new_ver >= current_ver)` (tainted operation)

### Conclusion
The `is_version_incremental` function processes tainted data from the `new_ver_str` parameter. The taint propagates through the conversion of `new_ver_str` to an unsigned long and affects the comparison with the current firmware version. The function's behavior can be influenced by the tainted data, which may lead to security implications if not properly validated or sanitized. The checks for version incrementality are crucial for ensuring that firmware updates are applied correctly and safely.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `read_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The taint source is now the `read_value` function, and the taint label includes the parameters `name`, `name_sz`, `value`, `value_sz`, and `count`.

### Taint Analysis Breakdown

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The function `read_value` is invoked with parameters: `name`, `name_sz`, `value`, `value_sz`, and `count`.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The parameters `name`, `name_sz`, `value`, and `value_sz` are marked as tainted, which means any operations involving these parameters will propagate the taint.

3. **Data Flow Analysis**:
   - The function begins by declaring a `TEE_ObjectHandle` variable `h` and initializing it to `TEE_HANDLE_NULL`. It also initializes a `TEE_Result` variable `res` to `TEE_SUCCESS` and sets up flags for access permissions.
   - It calls `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)`. The `name` and `name_sz` parameters are tainted, so this function operates on tainted data. The result of this call is stored in `res`.

4. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - If `res` is not successful, the function returns the error code without further processing, so no taint propagation occurs in this case.
   - If successful, it calls `TEE_OpenPersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, &h)`. The `name_full` is populated by the previous function call, and `flags` is not tainted. The result is again stored in `res`.
   - If `res` is not successful, it logs an error message and returns the error code. No taint propagation occurs in this case either.

5. **Reading Object Data**:
   - If the object is successfully opened, it calls `TEE_ReadObjectData(h, value, value_sz, count)`. The `value` and `value_sz` parameters are tainted, so this operation is also tainted. The `count` parameter is a pointer, and if it is modified, it will reflect the number of bytes read from the object.

6. **Closing the Object**:
   - After reading the object data, it calls `TEE_CloseObject(h)` to close the object handle. This operation does not affect taint.

7. **Return Value**:
   - The function returns the result stored in `res`, which indicates the success or failure of the read operation. The return value itself does not propagate taint but indicates the result of the tainted operations.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- **Taint Flow 1**: 
  - `name` (tainted) → `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)` (tainted operation)

- **Taint Flow 2**: 
  - `name_sz` (tainted) → `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)` (tainted operation)

- **Taint Flow 3**: 
  - `name_full` (not tainted) and `flags` (not tainted) → `TEE_OpenPersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, &h)` (not tainted operation)

- **Taint Flow 4**: 
  - `value` (tainted) and `value_sz` (tainted) → `TEE_ReadObjectData(h, value, value_sz, count)` (tainted operation)

- **Taint Flow 5**: 
  - `count` (tainted if modified) → reflects the number of bytes read from the object (tainted operation)

### Conclusion
The `read_value` function processes tainted data from the `name`, `name_sz`, `value`, and `value_sz` parameters. The taint propagates through the function, particularly affecting the calls to `get_named_object_name` and `TEE_ReadObjectData`. The function's behavior can be influenced by the tainted data, which may lead to security implications if not properly validated or sanitized. The successful reading of the object data is contingent upon the integrity of the tainted inputs, making it crucial to ensure that these inputs are validated before use.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `get_named_object_name` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The taint source is now the `get_named_object_name` function, and the taint label includes the parameters `name_orig`, `name_orig_size`, `name`, and `name_size`.

### Taint Analysis Breakdown

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The function `get_named_object_name` is invoked with parameters: `name_orig`, `name_orig_size`, `name`, and `name_size`.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The parameters `name_orig` and `name_orig_size` are marked as tainted, which means any operations involving these parameters will propagate the taint.

3. **Data Flow Analysis**:
   - The function begins by calculating the length of the `named_value_prefix` using `strlen(named_value_prefix)`. This operation does not involve tainted data and does not affect the taint flow.
   - It checks if the combined size of `name_orig_size` and `pref_len` exceeds `TEE_OBJECT_ID_MAX_LEN`. If it does, the function returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This check does not propagate taint since it does not involve any tainted data.

4. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - If the size check passes, the function uses `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len)` to copy the prefix into the `name` buffer. This operation does not involve tainted data and does not affect the taint flow.
   - It then concatenates the provided object name by calling `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)`. Since `name_orig` is tainted, this operation is tainted, and the `name` buffer will now contain tainted data.
   - The function sets `*name_size` to the total size of the new name, which is the sum of `name_orig_size` and `pref_len`. The `name_size` pointer itself is not tainted, but it reflects the size of the tainted data.

5. **Return Value**:
   - The function returns `TEE_SUCCESS`, indicating that the operation was successful. The return value itself does not propagate taint but indicates the result of the tainted operations.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- **Taint Flow 1**: 
  - `name_orig` (tainted) → `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)` (tainted operation)

- **Taint Flow 2**: 
  - `name_orig_size` (tainted) → `*name_size = name_orig_size + pref_len` (tainted operation)

### Conclusion
The `get_named_object_name` function processes tainted data from the `name_orig` and `name_orig_size` parameters. The taint propagates through the function, particularly affecting the call to `TEE_MemMove` that concatenates the object name. The resulting `name` buffer will contain tainted data, which may lead to security implications if not properly validated or sanitized. The function's behavior can be influenced by the tainted data, making it crucial to ensure that the inputs are validated before use.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `strlen` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The taint source is now the `strlen` function, and the taint label includes the parameter `arg1`, which represents the input string for which the length is being calculated.

### Taint Analysis Breakdown

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The function `strlen` is invoked with the parameter `arg1`, which is a string whose length is being calculated.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The parameter `arg1` is marked as tainted, which means any operations involving this parameter will propagate the taint.

3. **Data Flow Analysis**:
   - The `strlen` function calculates the length of the string pointed to by `arg1`. If `arg1` is tainted, the operation of calculating its length is also considered tainted.
   - The result of `strlen(arg1)` is a size value that indicates the number of characters in the string, excluding the null terminator. This result itself is not tainted, but it is derived from tainted data.

4. **Return Value**:
   - The return value of `strlen` is the length of the string, which is an integer. While the return value itself does not carry taint, it is derived from the tainted input, meaning that any subsequent operations that use this length value in conjunction with tainted data will also be affected by the taint.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- **Taint Flow 1**: 
  - `arg1` (tainted) → `strlen(arg1)` (tainted operation)

### Conclusion
The `strlen` function processes tainted data from the `arg1` parameter. The taint propagates through the function, affecting the calculation of the string length. While the return value of `strlen` itself is not tainted, it is derived from tainted data, which can influence subsequent operations that rely on this length. It is crucial to ensure that any string passed to `strlen` is validated to prevent potential security issues, especially when the length is used in further operations that involve memory allocation or data manipulation.

Based on the provided Trusted Application C code snippet, we can analyze the taint data flow originating from the `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` function. The taint source is the `cmd` parameter, which is used to determine which command to execute. The `params` array is marked as the taint label, indicating that it may contain tainted data that flows through the application.

Here are the data flows extracted from the code:

1. **Taint Source**:
   - `cmd` (input parameter) is the taint source.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The `cmd` parameter is used in a switch statement to determine which command to execute. The commands are:
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE`
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE`
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE`

3. **Data Flow Analysis**:
   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Tainted Data Flow: 
       - `cmd` (tainted) → `read_persist_value(pt, params)` (tainted data operation)
       - `params` is passed to `read_persist_value`, which may further manipulate or use the tainted data.
   
   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Tainted Data Flow:
       - `cmd` (tainted) → `write_persist_value(pt, params)` (tainted data operation)
       - `params` is passed to `write_persist_value`, which may further manipulate or use the tainted data.
   
   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Tainted Data Flow:
       - `cmd` (tainted) → `delete_persist_value(pt, params)` (tainted data operation)
       - `params` is passed to `delete_persist_value`, which may further manipulate or use the tainted data.

4. **Default Case**:
   - If `cmd` does not match any of the defined cases, it logs an error message and returns `TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`. This case does not propagate tainted data further.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- `cmd` (tainted) → `read_persist_value(pt, params)` (tainted data operation)
- `cmd` (tainted) → `write_persist_value(pt, params)` (tainted data operation)
- `cmd` (tainted) → `delete_persist_value(pt, params)` (tainted data operation)

In conclusion, the `params` array is influenced by the tainted `cmd` parameter, and the functions `read_persist_value`, `write_persist_value`, and `delete_persist_value` may operate on this tainted data, potentially leading to security vulnerabilities if not handled properly.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `write_persist_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The `params` parameter is marked as a taint label, and we will analyze how the tainted data flows through this function.

### Taint Source:
- The new taint source is the `params` parameter, specifically `params[0]` and `params[1]`, which are used to extract the `name_buf` and `value` respectively.

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Parameter Validation**:
   - The function first checks if the `pt` parameter matches the expected parameter types (`exp_pt`). If not, it returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This does not propagate taint but ensures that the function is called with the correct parameters.

2. **Extracting Tainted Data**:
   - `name_buf = params[0].memref.buffer;` (tainted)
   - `name_buf_sz = params[0].memref.size;` (tainted)
   - `value_sz = params[1].memref.size;` (tainted)
   - `value = TEE_Malloc(value_sz, 0);` (tainted if allocation is successful)

3. **Validation of `name_buf`**:
   - The function calls `check_valid_value(name_buf)`, which checks if the `name_buf` is valid. If it is not valid, it logs an error and returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This operation does not propagate taint but ensures that only valid data is processed.

4. **Overwrite Protection**:
   - The function checks if `name_buf` starts with a vendor prefix or the `ROLLBACK_PROT` string. If it does, the `overwrite` flag is set to `false`, preventing overwriting of certain values. This is a control flow operation based on tainted data.

5. **Memory Allocation for `value`**:
   - `value = TEE_Malloc(value_sz, 0);` (tainted if allocation is successful)
   - If the allocation fails, it returns `TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY`, which does not propagate taint.

6. **Copying Tainted Data**:
   - `TEE_MemMove(value, params[1].memref.buffer, value_sz);` (tainted)
   - This operation copies the tainted data from `params[1]` to `value`, which is now also tainted.

7. **Conditional Logic Based on Tainted Data**:
   - The function checks if `name_buf` starts with the vendor prefix and whether the `CFG_FIOVB_VENDOR_CREATE` is enabled. If not, it logs an error and sets `res` to `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`.
   - If `name_buf` does not match `BOOTFIRM_VER`, it calls `write_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, overwrite);` (tainted data operation).
   - If it matches `BOOTFIRM_VER`, it calls `increase_boot_firmware(value, value_sz);` (tainted data operation).

8. **Freeing Allocated Memory**:
   - `TEE_Free(value);` cleans up the allocated memory, but does not affect taint.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- `params[0].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `name_buf` (tainted)
- `params[0].memref.size` (tainted) → `name_buf_sz` (tainted)
- `params[1].memref.size` (tainted) → `value_sz` (tainted)
- `params[1].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `value` (tainted after `TEE_MemMove`)
- `name_buf` (tainted) → `check_valid_value(name_buf)` (validation)
- `name_buf` (tainted) → `write_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, overwrite)` (tainted data operation)
- `value` (tainted) → `increase_boot_firmware(value, value_sz)` (tainted data operation)

### Conclusion:
The `write_persist_value` function processes tainted data from the `params` parameter, specifically `params[0]` and `params[1]`. The function performs various checks and operations based on this tainted data, which could lead to security vulnerabilities if not properly validated and sanitized. The flow of tainted data through the function highlights the importance of careful handling of input parameters in secure applications.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `increase_boot_firmware` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` parameters are marked as taint labels, indicating that they may contain tainted data that flows through the function.

### Taint Source:
- The new taint source is `new_ver_str` (tainted data from `value` in the previous function) and `new_ver_sz` (tainted data from `value_sz` in the previous function).

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Rollback Protection Check**:
   - The function first checks if the system is rollback protected by calling `is_rollback_protected()`. This function does not propagate taint but is a control flow operation that determines whether the subsequent checks are performed.
   - It then checks if the new version string is incremental by calling `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)`. If the version is not incremental and rollback protection is enabled, it logs an error message and returns `TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED`. This operation does not propagate taint but ensures that only valid data is processed.

2. **Writing the New Version**:
   - If the checks pass, the function calls `write_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, new_ver_str, new_ver_sz, true);` (tainted data operation).
   - Here, `BOOTFIRM_VER` is a constant string representing the key for the boot firmware version, and `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` are the tainted data being written.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- `new_ver_str` (tainted) → `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)` (validation)
- `new_ver_str` (tainted) → `write_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, new_ver_str, new_ver_sz, true)` (tainted data operation)

### Conclusion:
The `increase_boot_firmware` function processes tainted data from the `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` parameters. It performs checks to ensure that the firmware version update is allowed based on rollback protection and version increment rules. If the checks pass, it proceeds to write the new firmware version using the `write_value` function, which is also a tainted data operation. The flow of tainted data through this function highlights the importance of validating input parameters and ensuring that only authorized updates are allowed in secure applications.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `write_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The `name`, `value`, `name_sz`, and `value_sz` parameters are marked as taint labels, indicating that they may contain tainted data that flows through the function.

### Taint Source:
- The new taint source is `name` (tainted data from `name_buf` in the previous function) and `value` (tainted data from `value` in the previous function).
- The sizes `name_sz` and `value_sz` are also tainted data.

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Flags Initialization**:
   - The function initializes the `flags` variable based on the configuration. If `CFG_FIOVB_VENDOR_CREATE` is defined, it sets the flags to allow read and write access. Otherwise, it only allows read access. This operation does not propagate taint but sets up the conditions for the subsequent operations.

2. **Overwrite Check**:
   - If `overwrite` is true, the function adds additional flags for write access and overwrite capability. This is a control flow operation based on tainted data.

3. **Getting the Full Object Name**:
   - `res = get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz);`
   - This function call uses the tainted `name` and `name_sz` to generate a full object name, which is stored in `name_full`. If this function returns an error, it is propagated back to the caller.

4. **Creating a Persistent Object**:
   - `res = TEE_CreatePersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, NULL, value, value_sz, &h);`
   - This operation attempts to create a persistent object using the tainted `name_full`, `flags`, `value`, and `value_sz`. If the operation fails due to an access conflict, it logs an error message. If it fails for any other reason, it logs a different error message. Both of these operations involve tainted data.

5. **Closing the Object**:
   - `TEE_CloseObject(h);` is called to close the object handle. This operation does not affect taint but is important for resource management.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- `name` (tainted) → `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)` (tainted data operation)
- `name_sz` (tainted) → `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)` (tainted data operation)
- `name_full` (derived from tainted `name`) → `TEE_CreatePersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, NULL, value, value_sz, &h)` (tainted data operation)
- `value` (tainted) → `TEE_CreatePersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, NULL, value, value_sz, &h)` (tainted data operation)
- `value_sz` (tainted) → `TEE_CreatePersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, NULL, value, value_sz, &h)` (tainted data operation)

### Conclusion:
The `write_value` function processes tainted data from the `name`, `value`, `name_sz`, and `value_sz` parameters. It performs operations to create a persistent object based on this tainted data, which could lead to security vulnerabilities if not properly validated and sanitized. The flow of tainted data through this function highlights the importance of careful handling of input parameters and ensuring that only authorized data is written to persistent storage in secure applications.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `get_named_object_name` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The `name_orig` and `name_orig_size` parameters are marked as taint labels, indicating that they may contain tainted data that flows through the function.

### Taint Source:
- The new taint source is `name_orig` (tainted data from `name` in the previous function) and `name_orig_size` (tainted data from `name_sz` in the previous function).

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Length Check**:
   - The function first checks if the combined length of `name_orig_size` and the length of `named_value_prefix` exceeds `TEE_OBJECT_ID_MAX_LEN`. If it does, it returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This operation does not propagate taint but ensures that the function is called with valid parameters.

2. **Prefix Initialization**:
   - `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len);`
   - This operation copies the `named_value_prefix` into the `name` buffer. This operation does not involve tainted data, as the prefix is a constant.

3. **Concatenating the Object Name**:
   - `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size);`
   - This operation copies the tainted `name_orig` into the `name` buffer, starting at the position after the prefix. This operation propagates the taint from `name_orig` into the `name` buffer.

4. **Setting the Output Size**:
   - `*name_size = name_orig_size + pref_len;`
   - This operation sets the output size of the concatenated name. It does not propagate taint but is important for the caller to know the size of the resulting name.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- `name_orig` (tainted) → `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)` (tainted data operation)
- `name_orig_size` (tainted) → `if (name_orig_size + pref_len > TEE_OBJECT_ID_MAX_LEN)` (validation)
- `*name_size` (derived from tainted `name_orig_size`) → `*name_size = name_orig_size + pref_len` (output size)

### Conclusion:
The `get_named_object_name` function processes tainted data from the `name_orig` and `name_orig_size` parameters. It performs a length check to ensure that the combined size does not exceed the maximum allowed length and then constructs a new name by concatenating a prefix with the original name. The taint from `name_orig` is propagated into the `name` buffer, which will be used in subsequent operations. This highlights the importance of validating input parameters and ensuring that only properly formatted and authorized data is used in secure applications.

In this analysis, we will focus on the `strlen` function, which is an external function used to determine the length of a string. The `arg1` parameter, which represents the input string to `strlen`, is marked as a taint label, indicating that it may contain tainted data.

### Taint Source:
- The new taint source is `arg1`, which is the input string passed to the `strlen` function. This string can be tainted data from previous operations.

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Length Calculation**:
   - The `strlen(arg1)` function call computes the length of the string pointed to by `arg1`. If `arg1` is tainted, the result of `strlen` is influenced by potentially untrusted data.
   - The result of `strlen(arg1)` is used in the `get_named_object_name` function to determine the total size of the concatenated name, specifically in the line:
     ```c
     if (name_orig_size + pref_len > TEE_OBJECT_ID_MAX_LEN)
     ```
   - This operation does not directly modify or propagate taint but relies on the integrity of the input data. If `arg1` is tainted, the length calculated could lead to improper handling of the resulting data.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- `arg1` (tainted) → `strlen(arg1)` (tainted data operation)
- The result of `strlen(arg1)` is used in the context of validating the size of the concatenated name in the `get_named_object_name` function.

### Conclusion:
The `strlen` function processes tainted data from the `arg1` parameter. While `strlen` itself does not modify the data, it relies on the integrity of the input string to provide a correct length. If the input string is tainted, it could lead to potential vulnerabilities in subsequent operations that depend on this length, such as buffer overflows or improper memory allocation. Therefore, it is crucial to ensure that any data passed to `strlen` is properly validated and sanitized before use in secure applications.

Based on the provided C code snippet, we can analyze the data flow with respect to the taint source and the taint label. The taint source is the `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` function, and the taint label is associated with the `params` parameter. Here’s the breakdown of the data flows:

1. **Taint Source**: 
   - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` function is invoked with parameters including `params`.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The `params` array is marked as tainted data. This means any operations that involve `params` will propagate the taint.

3. **Data Flow Analysis**:
   - When the function is called, the `params` array is passed to the following functions based on the command (`cmd`):
     - **Command: `TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE`**
       - Tainted Data Flow: 
         - `params` → `read_persist_value(pt, params)`
     - **Command: `TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE`**
       - Tainted Data Flow: 
         - `params` → `write_persist_value(pt, params)`
     - **Command: `TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE`**
       - Tainted Data Flow: 
         - `params` → `delete_persist_value(pt, params)`

4. **Summary of Data Flows**:
   - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` → `read_persist_value(pt, params)` (if `cmd` is `TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE`)
   - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` → `write_persist_value(pt, params)` (if `cmd` is `TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE`)
   - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` → `delete_persist_value(pt, params)` (if `cmd` is `TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE`)

In conclusion, the `params` parameter is tainted when passed to the respective command functions, and the taint propagates through these function calls. Each command function will need to be analyzed further to determine how they handle the tainted data.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `read_persist_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The taint source is now `read_persist_value`, and the taint label remains the `params` parameter.

### Taint Source:
- **Function**: `read_persist_value`
- **Taint Label**: `params` (specifically `params[0]` and `params[1]`)

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Parameter Validation**:
   - The function checks if `pt` matches `exp_pt`. If not, it returns an error. This does not affect taint propagation.

2. **Data Aliasing**:
   - `name_buf` is assigned from `params[0].memref.buffer`, which is tainted.
   - `name_buf_sz` is assigned from `params[0].memref.size`, which is also tainted.
   - `value` is allocated memory based on `params[1].memref.size`, which is tainted.

3. **Function Call with Tainted Data**:
   - The function `check_valid_value(name_buf)` is called with `name_buf`, which is tainted. If this function returns an error, it logs a message and returns an error code. The taint is still present but does not propagate further in this case.

4. **Memory Allocation**:
   - `value` is allocated using `TEE_Malloc(value_sz, 0)`, where `value_sz` is derived from `params[1].memref.size`. If the allocation fails, it returns an error. The taint is still present in the context of the allocated memory.

5. **Reading Value**:
   - The function `read_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, &count)` is called with `name_buf` (tainted), `name_buf_sz` (tainted), and `value` (tainted). The taint propagates through this function call.

6. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - `TEE_MemMove(params[1].memref.buffer, value, value_sz)` moves the contents of `value` (tainted) to `params[1].memref.buffer`, which is also tainted.
   - `params[1].memref.size` is updated with `count`, which may be influenced by the tainted data.

7. **Memory Deallocation**:
   - `TEE_Free(value)` is called to free the allocated memory. This does not affect taint propagation but is important for resource management.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- `read_persist_value` → `params[0].memref.buffer` (tainted)
- `read_persist_value` → `params[0].memref.size` (tainted)
- `read_persist_value` → `check_valid_value(name_buf)` (tainted)
- `read_persist_value` → `read_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, &count)` (tainted)
- `read_persist_value` → `TEE_MemMove(params[1].memref.buffer, value, value_sz)` (tainted)
- `read_persist_value` → `params[1].memref.size = count` (tainted)

### Conclusion:
The `read_persist_value` function processes tainted data from the `params` parameter, propagating the taint through various operations and function calls. The taint remains present in the output parameters, specifically in `params[1]`, which could lead to potential security issues if not handled properly. Further analysis of the `read_value` and `check_valid_value` functions would be necessary to fully understand the implications of the taint propagation.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `read_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The taint source is now `read_value`, and the taint label remains the `params` parameter, specifically the `value` parameter.

### Taint Source:
- **Function**: `read_value`
- **Taint Label**: `value` (passed as a parameter)

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Parameter Inputs**:
   - The function receives `name` (tainted), `name_sz` (tainted), `value` (tainted), `value_sz` (tainted), and `count` (tainted as it is a pointer to a variable that may be modified).

2. **Data Aliasing**:
   - `name` is a pointer to a tainted buffer (from `params[0].memref.buffer`).
   - `value` is a pointer to a tainted buffer (from `params[1].memref.buffer`).
   - `count` is a pointer to a variable that may be modified based on the read operation.

3. **Function Calls with Tainted Data**:
   - The function `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)` is called with `name` (tainted) and `name_sz` (tainted). If this function returns an error, it propagates the taint but does not affect the output directly.

4. **Opening Persistent Object**:
   - The function `TEE_OpenPersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, &h)` is called. The `name_full` is derived from the previous function call, and while it is not directly tainted, the operation depends on the tainted input. If this call fails, it logs an error message and returns the error code.

5. **Reading Object Data**:
   - The function `TEE_ReadObjectData(h, value, value_sz, count)` is called with `value` (tainted) and `value_sz` (tainted). This operation reads data into the `value` buffer, which is tainted. The `count` parameter is also modified based on the read operation, which may affect the taint.

6. **Closing Object**:
   - `TEE_CloseObject(h)` is called to close the object handle. This does not affect taint propagation but is important for resource management.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- `read_value` → `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)` (tainted)
- `read_value` → `TEE_OpenPersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, &h)` (tainted indirectly)
- `read_value` → `TEE_ReadObjectData(h, value, value_sz, count)` (tainted)
- `read_value` → `count` (modified, tainted)

### Conclusion:
The `read_value` function processes tainted data from the `params` parameter, specifically the `value` buffer, which is modified during the read operation. The taint propagates through various operations and function calls, and the `count` variable is also affected by the read operation. This function's handling of tainted data is critical, as it directly influences the output buffer, which could lead to security vulnerabilities if not properly validated or sanitized. Further analysis of the `get_named_object_name` and `TEE_OpenPersistentObject` functions would be necessary to fully understand the implications of the taint propagation.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `get_named_object_name` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The taint source is now `get_named_object_name`, and the taint label remains the `params` parameter, specifically the `name_orig` parameter.

### Taint Source:
- **Function**: `get_named_object_name`
- **Taint Label**: `name_orig` (passed as a parameter)

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Parameter Inputs**:
   - The function receives `name_orig` (tainted), `name_orig_size` (tainted), `name` (output buffer), and `name_size` (pointer to a variable that will be modified).

2. **Data Aliasing**:
   - `name_orig` is a pointer to a tainted buffer (from `params[0].memref.buffer`).
   - `name` is a buffer that will be populated with the concatenated result, starting with a prefix and followed by the contents of `name_orig`.
   - `name_size` is a pointer to a variable that will be modified to reflect the size of the concatenated name.

3. **Parameter Validation**:
   - The function checks if the combined size of `name_orig_size` and the length of `named_value_prefix` exceeds `TEE_OBJECT_ID_MAX_LEN`. If it does, it returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This check does not affect taint propagation but ensures that the function does not proceed with invalid parameters.

4. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len)` copies the prefix into the `name` buffer. This operation does not introduce taint but sets up the buffer for further operations.
   - `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)` copies the contents of `name_orig` (tainted) into the `name` buffer after the prefix. This operation propagates the taint from `name_orig` into the `name` buffer.
   - `*name_size = name_orig_size + pref_len` modifies the `name_size` variable to reflect the total size of the concatenated name. This variable is now tainted as it is influenced by the tainted input.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- `get_named_object_name` → `name_orig` (tainted)
- `get_named_object_name` → `name` (tainted after copying `name_orig`)
- `get_named_object_name` → `name_size` (modified, tainted)

### Conclusion:
The `get_named_object_name` function processes tainted data from the `params` parameter, specifically the `name_orig` buffer, which is copied into the `name` buffer. The taint propagates through the memory operations, and the `name_size` variable is also affected by the tainted input. This function is critical for constructing the object name used in subsequent operations, and any vulnerabilities in handling this tainted data could lead to security issues. Further analysis of how the `name` buffer is used in subsequent functions (like `TEE_OpenPersistentObject`) would be necessary to fully understand the implications of the taint propagation.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `strlen` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The taint source is now `strlen`, and the taint label is the parameter passed to it, which we will refer to as `arg1`.

### Taint Source:
- **Function**: `strlen`
- **Taint Label**: `arg1` (the input string whose length is being calculated)

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Parameter Input**:
   - The function `strlen` takes a single parameter, which is a pointer to a character array (string). In the context of our previous analysis, this would be `named_value_prefix`, which is a constant string and not tainted. However, if we consider the context of the previous function, `name_orig` was tainted, and its length was checked against the maximum allowed length.

2. **Data Aliasing**:
   - The `arg1` parameter in this case is not directly tainted since it refers to a constant string (`named_value_prefix`). However, it is important to note that the length of `name_orig` is derived from a tainted source, and the result of `strlen` is used in a conditional check that affects the flow of the program.

3. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The `strlen` function computes the length of the string passed to it. In this case, it is used to determine the length of `named_value_prefix`, which is not tainted. However, the result of this operation is used in conjunction with the tainted `name_orig_size` to validate the total size.
   - The result of `strlen(named_value_prefix)` is stored in `pref_len`, which is then used in the conditional check:
     ```c
     if (name_orig_size + pref_len > TEE_OBJECT_ID_MAX_LEN)
         return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
     ```
   - This check ensures that the combined size of the prefix and the original name does not exceed the maximum allowed length. While `pref_len` itself is not tainted, it is critical in determining whether the function can proceed with potentially tainted data.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- `strlen` → `arg1` (in this case, `named_value_prefix`, which is not tainted)
- `strlen` → `pref_len` (result of the length calculation, not tainted)
- The conditional check involving `name_orig_size` (tainted) and `pref_len` (not tainted) determines the flow of the program.

### Conclusion:
The `strlen` function itself does not introduce or propagate taint since it operates on a constant string (`named_value_prefix`). However, its output is used in a critical validation step that involves tainted data (`name_orig_size`). This highlights the importance of careful handling of data flow, as the validation logic relies on both tainted and non-tainted data. The overall security of the function depends on ensuring that the tainted data does not lead to buffer overflows or other vulnerabilities in subsequent operations. Further analysis of how the results of this function are used in the context of the overall application would be necessary to fully understand the implications of the taint propagation.

Based on the provided Trusted Application C code snippet, we can analyze the taint data flow originating from the `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` function. The taint source is the `cmd` parameter, which is used to determine which command to execute. The `params` array is marked as the taint label, and we will track how the tainted data flows through the function.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - `cmd` (input parameter) is the taint source.

2. **Tainted Parameters**:
   - `params` (input parameter) is marked as the taint label.

3. **Command Handling**:
   - The `cmd` parameter is used in a switch statement to determine which command to execute. The commands are:
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE`
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE`
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE`

4. **Data Flow Paths**:
   - **Path 1**: 
     - If `cmd` is `TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE`:
       - Tainted data from `params` is passed to `read_persist_value(pt, params)`.
       - Tainted data flow: `cmd` → `params` → `read_persist_value`
   
   - **Path 2**: 
     - If `cmd` is `TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE`:
       - Tainted data from `params` is passed to `write_persist_value(pt, params)`.
       - Tainted data flow: `cmd` → `params` → `write_persist_value`
   
   - **Path 3**: 
     - If `cmd` is `TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE`:
       - Tainted data from `params` is passed to `delete_persist_value(pt, params)`.
       - Tainted data flow: `cmd` → `params` → `delete_persist_value`

5. **Default Case**:
   - If `cmd` does not match any of the defined commands, a message is logged, and an error is returned. There is no tainted data flow in this case.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow 1**: 
  - `cmd` (TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE) → `params` → `read_persist_value`

- **Tainted Data Flow 2**: 
  - `cmd` (TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE) → `params` → `write_persist_value`

- **Tainted Data Flow 3**: 
  - `cmd` (TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE) → `params` → `delete_persist_value`

In conclusion, the tainted data flows from the `cmd` parameter to the `params` array and subsequently to the respective command handling functions based on the value of `cmd`. Each command function may further process the tainted data, which should be analyzed separately for potential vulnerabilities.

Continuing from the previous taint analysis, we will now analyze the `delete_persist_value` function. The new taint source is the `delete_persist_value` function itself, and the `params` parameter is marked as the taint label. We will track the tainted data flow, data aliases, and any operations performed on the tainted data.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The function `delete_persist_value` is the new taint source.

2. **Tainted Parameters**:
   - `params` (input parameter) is marked as the taint label.

3. **Parameter Validation**:
   - The function checks if `pt` matches the expected parameter type (`exp_pt`).
   - If `pt` does not match, it returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. There is no tainted data flow in this case.

4. **Extracting Tainted Data**:
   - `name_buf` is assigned the value of `params[0].memref.buffer`, which is a pointer to the buffer containing the name to be deleted.
   - `name_buf_sz` is assigned the value of `params[0].memref.size`, which indicates the size of the buffer.
   - Tainted data flow: `params` → `name_buf` (data aliasing occurs here).

5. **Access Control Check**:
   - The function checks if the `name_buf` starts with the string `ROLLBACK_PROT` using `strncmp`.
   - If it does, the function returns `TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED`. This operation involves tainted data (`name_buf`), and if the condition is true, it prevents further processing of the tainted data.

6. **Deleting the Value**:
   - If the access control check passes, the function calls `delete_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz)`, passing the tainted data (`name_buf` and `name_buf_sz`) to this function.
   - Tainted data flow: `name_buf` → `delete_value`.

7. **Return Value**:
   - The result of the `delete_value` function is returned as the result of `delete_persist_value`.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `params` → `name_buf` (data aliasing)
  - `params` → `name_buf_sz`
  - `name_buf` → `delete_value` (tainted data operation)

### Data Aliases and Tainted Data Operations

- **Data Aliases**:
  - `name_buf` is an alias for `params[0].memref.buffer`, which is the actual buffer containing the name to be deleted.
  - `name_buf_sz` is an alias for `params[0].memref.size`, which indicates the size of the buffer.

- **Tainted Data Operations**:
  - The function performs a comparison operation on the tainted data (`name_buf`) to check for access control.
  - The function calls `delete_value`, which operates on the tainted data (`name_buf` and `name_buf_sz`).

### Conclusion

The `delete_persist_value` function processes tainted data from the `params` parameter, specifically extracting the name to be deleted. It performs an access control check on the tainted data and subsequently calls another function to delete the value if the check passes. The analysis highlights the importance of ensuring that the tainted data is properly validated and controlled to prevent unauthorized access or deletion of sensitive data. Further analysis of the `delete_value` function would be necessary to assess how it handles the tainted data.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `delete_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, which is the `delete_value` function itself, and the `params` parameter marked as the taint label. We will track the tainted data flow, data aliases, and any operations performed on the tainted data.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The function `delete_value` is the new taint source.

2. **Tainted Parameters**:
   - `name` (input parameter) is marked as the taint label, which is derived from `params[0].memref.buffer` in the previous function.
   - `name_sz` (input parameter) is also derived from `params[0].memref.size`.

3. **Variable Initialization**:
   - `TEE_ObjectHandle h` is initialized to `TEE_HANDLE_NULL`.
   - `TEE_Result res` is initialized to `TEE_SUCCESS`.
   - `flags` is set to allow read access and write access to metadata.

4. **Buffer for Full Object Name**:
   - `char name_full[TEE_OBJECT_ID_MAX_LEN]` is declared to hold the full name of the object to be deleted.
   - `uint32_t name_full_sz` is initialized to 0.

5. **Getting the Full Object Name**:
   - The function calls `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)`, passing the tainted data (`name` and `name_sz`) to retrieve the full name of the object.
   - Tainted data flow: `name` → `get_named_object_name` (tainted data operation).
   - If `res` is not successful, the function returns the error code.

6. **Opening the Persistent Object**:
   - The function calls `TEE_OpenPersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, &h)`, using the full name obtained from the previous step.
   - Tainted data flow: `name_full` (not tainted, but derived from tainted data) → `TEE_OpenPersistentObject`.
   - If `res` is not successful, an error message is logged, and the function returns the error code.

7. **Closing and Deleting the Persistent Object**:
   - The function calls `TEE_CloseAndDeletePersistentObject1(h)`, which attempts to delete the persistent object identified by the handle `h`.
   - If `res` is not successful, an error message is logged.
   - The result of this operation is returned.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `params` → `name` (data aliasing)
  - `params` → `name_sz` (data aliasing)
  - `name` → `get_named_object_name` (tainted data operation)
  - `name_full` (derived from tainted data) → `TEE_OpenPersistentObject`

### Data Aliases and Tainted Data Operations

- **Data Aliases**:
  - `name` is an alias for `params[0].memref.buffer`, which contains the name to be deleted.
  - `name_sz` is an alias for `params[0].memref.size`, which indicates the size of the name buffer.
  - `name_full` is a local buffer that will hold the full name of the object, derived from the tainted data.

- **Tainted Data Operations**:
  - The function performs a call to `get_named_object_name`, which processes the tainted data (`name` and `name_sz`).
  - The function then attempts to open a persistent object using the full name derived from the tainted data.
  - Finally, it calls `TEE_CloseAndDeletePersistentObject1`, which operates on the object handle obtained from the previous operation.

### Conclusion

The `delete_value` function processes tainted data from the `params` parameter, specifically extracting the name to be deleted. It performs operations to retrieve the full name of the object and attempts to open and delete the persistent object. The analysis highlights the importance of ensuring that the tainted data is properly validated and controlled throughout these operations to prevent unauthorized access or deletion of sensitive data. Further analysis of the `get_named_object_name` and `TEE_OpenPersistentObject` functions would be necessary to assess how they handle the tainted data and whether they implement appropriate security measures.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `get_named_object_name` function, we will identify the new taint source, which is the `get_named_object_name` function itself, and the `params` parameter marked as the taint label. We will track the tainted data flow, data aliases, and any operations performed on the tainted data.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The function `get_named_object_name` is the new taint source.

2. **Tainted Parameters**:
   - `name_orig` (input parameter) is marked as the taint label, which is derived from `name` in the `delete_value` function.
   - `name_orig_size` (input parameter) is derived from `name_sz` in the `delete_value` function.
   - `name` (output parameter) is where the full object name will be constructed.
   - `name_size` (output parameter) is a pointer to store the size of the constructed name.

3. **Prefix Length Calculation**:
   - `size_t pref_len` is initialized to the length of `named_value_prefix`, which is a constant string that will be prepended to the object name.

4. **Parameter Validation**:
   - The function checks if the combined size of `name_orig_size` and `pref_len` exceeds `TEE_OBJECT_ID_MAX_LEN`.
   - If it does, the function returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. There is no tainted data flow in this case.

5. **Constructing the Full Object Name**:
   - The function uses `TEE_MemMove` to copy the `named_value_prefix` into the `name` buffer.
   - Tainted data flow: `named_value_prefix` → `name` (not tainted, but part of the operation).
   - The function then concatenates the provided object name by copying `name_orig` into the `name` buffer starting at the position after the prefix.
   - Tainted data flow: `name_orig` → `name` (tainted data operation).

6. **Setting the Name Size**:
   - The function sets the value pointed to by `name_size` to the total size of the constructed name (`name_orig_size + pref_len`).

7. **Return Value**:
   - The function returns `TEE_SUCCESS` upon successful completion.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `name` (output parameter) is constructed from `name_orig` (tainted data).
  - `name_orig` → `name` (tainted data operation).

### Data Aliases and Tainted Data Operations

- **Data Aliases**:
  - `name_orig` is an alias for `name` in the `delete_value` function, which contains the original name to be deleted.
  - `name_orig_size` is an alias for `name_sz` in the `delete_value` function, which indicates the size of the original name.
  - `name` is the output buffer where the full object name is constructed.
  - `name_size` is a pointer that will hold the size of the constructed name.

- **Tainted Data Operations**:
  - The function performs a check on the size of the input parameters to ensure they do not exceed the maximum allowed length.
  - The function uses `TEE_MemMove` to copy the prefix and the original name into the `name` buffer, with the original name being tainted data.

### Conclusion

The `get_named_object_name` function processes tainted data from the `delete_value` function, specifically constructing a full object name by combining a prefix with the original name. The analysis highlights the importance of ensuring that the tainted data is properly validated and controlled throughout these operations. The function checks for buffer overflows, which is a good practice, but further analysis of how the `name` buffer is used in subsequent functions (like `TEE_OpenPersistentObject`) would be necessary to ensure that it is handled securely.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `strlen` function, we will identify the new taint source, which is the `strlen` function itself, and the `arg1` parameter marked as the taint label. Since the implementation of `strlen` is unavailable, we will analyze its behavior based on its typical functionality and how it interacts with tainted data.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The function `strlen` is the new taint source.

2. **Tainted Parameters**:
   - `arg1` (input parameter) is marked as the taint label, which corresponds to the string whose length is being calculated. In the context of previous functions, this could be `name_orig` from the `get_named_object_name` function.

3. **Functionality of `strlen`**:
   - The `strlen` function computes the length of a null-terminated string. It returns the number of characters in the string, excluding the null terminator.
   - The input string (`arg1`) is expected to be a pointer to a character array.

4. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - When `strlen` is called with a tainted parameter (e.g., `name_orig`), the length of that tainted string is computed.
   - The result of `strlen` is not tainted, but it is derived from tainted data. This means that any subsequent operations that depend on this length could potentially be affected by the tainted nature of the input string.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `arg1` (tainted data) → `strlen` → length of the string (not tainted, but derived from tainted data).

### Data Aliases and Tainted Data Operations

- **Data Aliases**:
  - `arg1` is an alias for the string being passed to `strlen`, which could be `name_orig` from the `get_named_object_name` function.

- **Tainted Data Operations**:
  - The operation of calculating the length of the string using `strlen` is a tainted data operation since it relies on the tainted input.

### Conclusion

The `strlen` function processes tainted data by calculating the length of a string that may contain sensitive information. While the output of `strlen` itself is not tainted, it is derived from tainted data, which means that any subsequent operations that use this length must be carefully managed to avoid potential vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows or improper memory access. It is crucial to ensure that any data derived from tainted sources is handled securely in the context of the overall application logic. Further analysis of how the length is used in subsequent operations would be necessary to ensure that it does not lead to security issues.

Based on the provided Trusted Application C code snippet, we can analyze the taint data flow originating from the `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` function. The taint source is the `cmd` parameter, which is used to determine which command to execute. The `params` array is marked as the taint label, indicating that it may contain tainted data that flows through the application.

Here are the data flows extracted from the code:

1. **Taint Source**:
   - `cmd` (input parameter) is the taint source.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The `cmd` parameter is used in a switch statement to determine which command to execute. The commands are:
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE`
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE`
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE`

3. **Data Flow Analysis**:
   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Tainted Data Flow: 
       - `cmd` (tainted) → `read_persist_value(pt, params)` (tainted data operation)
       - `params` is passed to `read_persist_value`, which may further manipulate or use the tainted data.
   
   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Tainted Data Flow:
       - `cmd` (tainted) → `write_persist_value(pt, params)` (tainted data operation)
       - `params` is passed to `write_persist_value`, which may further manipulate or use the tainted data.

   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Tainted Data Flow:
       - `cmd` (tainted) → `delete_persist_value(pt, params)` (tainted data operation)
       - `params` is passed to `delete_persist_value`, which may further manipulate or use the tainted data.

4. **Default Case**:
   - If `cmd` does not match any of the defined cases, it logs an error message and returns `TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`. This does not involve any tainted data operations.

### Summary of Data Flows:
- `cmd` (tainted) → `read_persist_value(pt, params)` (tainted data operation)
- `cmd` (tainted) → `write_persist_value(pt, params)` (tainted data operation)
- `cmd` (tainted) → `delete_persist_value(pt, params)` (tainted data operation)

In conclusion, the `params` array is influenced by the tainted `cmd` parameter through the respective command functions, which may further process or utilize the tainted data.

Continuing the taint analysis from the `write_persist_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The `params` parameter is marked as the taint label, and we will analyze how the tainted data flows through this function.

### Taint Source:
- The new taint source is the `params` parameter, specifically `params[0]` and `params[1]`, which are used to extract the `name_buf` and `value` respectively.

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Parameter Validation**:
   - The function first checks if the `pt` parameter matches the expected parameter types (`exp_pt`). If not, it returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This does not involve tainted data operations.

2. **Extracting Tainted Data**:
   - `name_buf = params[0].memref.buffer;` (tainted)
   - `name_buf_sz = params[0].memref.size;` (tainted)
   - `value_sz = params[1].memref.size;` (tainted)
   - `value = TEE_Malloc(value_sz, 0);` (tainted if `value_sz` is derived from tainted data)

3. **Validation of `name_buf`**:
   - `check_valid_value(name_buf)` is called with `name_buf` (tainted). If this function returns an error, it logs an error message and returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This indicates that the function is sensitive to the content of `name_buf`.

4. **Overwrite Protection**:
   - The function checks if `name_buf` starts with a vendor prefix or a rollback protection string. If it does, the `overwrite` flag is set to `false`. This is a conditional operation based on tainted data.

5. **Memory Allocation**:
   - `value = TEE_Malloc(value_sz, 0);` allocates memory for `value`, which is based on the size derived from `params[1]`. If `value` is `NULL`, it returns `TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY`.

6. **Copying Tainted Data**:
   - `TEE_MemMove(value, params[1].memref.buffer, value_sz);` copies the tainted data from `params[1].memref.buffer` to `value`. This is a direct operation on tainted data.

7. **Conditional Logic**:
   - The function checks if `name_buf` starts with the vendor prefix and whether the `CFG_FIOVB_VENDOR_CREATE` configuration is enabled. If not, it logs an error and sets `res` to `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`.
   - If `name_buf` does not match `BOOTFIRM_VER`, it calls `write_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, overwrite);`, which operates on tainted data.
   - If it matches `BOOTFIRM_VER`, it calls `increase_boot_firmware(value, value_sz);`, which also operates on tainted data.

8. **Memory Cleanup**:
   - `TEE_Free(value);` is called to free the allocated memory for `value`, which is a cleanup operation.

### Data Flow Summary:
- `params[0].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `name_buf` (tainted)
- `params[0].memref.size` (tainted) → `name_buf_sz` (tainted)
- `params[1].memref.size` (tainted) → `value_sz` (tainted)
- `params[1].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `value` (tainted after `TEE_Malloc`)
- `check_valid_value(name_buf)` (tainted operation)
- `TEE_MemMove(value, params[1].memref.buffer, value_sz)` (tainted operation)
- `write_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, overwrite)` (tainted operation)
- `increase_boot_firmware(value, value_sz)` (tainted operation)

### Conclusion:
The `write_persist_value` function processes tainted data from the `params` parameter, specifically `params[0]` and `params[1]`. The function performs various operations that depend on the content of the tainted data, including validation, memory allocation, and conditional logic based on the tainted `name_buf`. The flow of tainted data is critical to understanding potential vulnerabilities in this function.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `increase_boot_firmware` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` parameters are marked as the taint label, indicating that they may contain tainted data.

### Taint Source:
- The new taint source is `new_ver_str`, which is derived from the `value` parameter in the `write_persist_value` function. The `new_ver_sz` is also derived from the tainted data.

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Rollback Protection Check**:
   - The function first checks if the system is rollback protected by calling `is_rollback_protected()`. This does not involve tainted data.
   - It then checks if the new version string is incremental by calling `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)`. This operation uses the tainted `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz`.

2. **Error Handling**:
   - If the rollback protection is active and the version is not incremental, it logs an error message and returns `TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED`. This indicates that the function is sensitive to the content of the tainted `new_ver_str`.

3. **Writing the New Version**:
   - If the checks pass, the function calls `write_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, new_ver_str, new_ver_sz, true);`. This operation uses the tainted `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` to write the new boot firmware version.

### Data Flow Summary:
- `new_ver_str` (tainted) → used in `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)` (tainted operation)
- If the checks pass, `new_ver_str` (tainted) → `write_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, new_ver_str, new_ver_sz, true)` (tainted operation)

### Conclusion:
The `increase_boot_firmware` function processes tainted data from the `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` parameters. It performs checks that depend on the content of the tainted data and conditionally writes the new boot firmware version using the `write_value` function. The flow of tainted data is critical to understanding potential vulnerabilities in this function, particularly regarding the rollback protection mechanism and the conditions under which the firmware version can be updated.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `is_rollback_protected` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The function checks whether rollback protection is enabled based on the value read from persistent storage.

### Taint Source:
- The new taint source is the result of the `read_value` function, which retrieves the value associated with the `ROLLBACK_PROT` key. The `value` buffer is used to store this data.

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Reading Rollback Protection Value**:
   - The function initializes a buffer `value` of size `MAX_SIMPLE_VALUE_SIZE` to store the result of the read operation.
   - It calls `read_value(ROLLBACK_PROT, strlen(ROLLBACK_PROT) + 1, value, value_sz, &count);`. This operation reads the value associated with the `ROLLBACK_PROT` key into the `value` buffer. The `value` buffer is not directly tainted, but it is influenced by the data stored in persistent storage.

2. **Checking the Result**:
   - After the read operation, the function checks if `res` is equal to `TEE_SUCCESS`. If it is, it logs a message indicating that rollback protection is enabled and returns `true`. This indicates that the function is sensitive to the result of the read operation.

3. **Return Value**:
   - If the read operation fails (i.e., `res` is not `TEE_SUCCESS`), the function returns `false`. This indicates that rollback protection is not enabled.

### Data Flow Summary:
- `read_value(ROLLBACK_PROT, strlen(ROLLBACK_PROT) + 1, value, value_sz, &count)` (tainted operation)
  - The `value` buffer is populated based on the persistent storage associated with `ROLLBACK_PROT`, but it is not directly tainted in the same way as user input.
- The outcome of the read operation (`res`) determines the return value of the function, which indirectly influences the flow of control in the calling function (`increase_boot_firmware`).

### Conclusion:
The `is_rollback_protected` function checks whether rollback protection is enabled by reading a value from persistent storage. While the `value` buffer itself is not tainted in the traditional sense (as it does not come from user input), it is influenced by the data stored in the system. The function's behavior is contingent on the success of the read operation, which is critical for the logic in the `increase_boot_firmware` function. The flow of data in this function is essential for understanding the conditions under which rollback protection is enforced.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `read_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. This function is responsible for reading a value associated with a given name from persistent storage.

### Taint Source:
- The new taint source is the `name` parameter, which is used to identify the object from which data is read. The `value` parameter is also marked as a taint label since it is where the read data will be stored.

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Getting the Full Object Name**:
   - The function calls `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz);` to convert the provided `name` into a full object name. This operation uses the tainted `name` parameter.
   - If this operation fails (i.e., `res` is not `TEE_SUCCESS`), it returns the error code immediately. This indicates that the function is sensitive to the content of the `name` parameter.

2. **Opening the Persistent Object**:
   - The function attempts to open a persistent object using `TEE_OpenPersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, &h);`. The `name_full` is derived from the tainted `name`, and if this operation fails, it logs an error message and returns the error code. This operation is also sensitive to the data derived from the tainted `name`.

3. **Reading Object Data**:
   - The function calls `TEE_ReadObjectData(h, value, value_sz, count);` to read data from the opened object into the `value` buffer. This operation is critical as it directly manipulates the `value` parameter, which is marked as tainted.
   - If this operation fails, it logs an error message indicating the failure to read the named object and returns the error code.

4. **Closing the Object**:
   - After attempting to read the data, the function calls `TEE_CloseObject(h);` to close the persistent object handle. This is a cleanup operation and does not involve tainted data.

### Data Flow Summary:
- `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)` (tainted operation)
  - `name` (tainted) → `name_full` (derived from tainted data)
- `TEE_OpenPersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, &h)` (tainted operation)
  - `name_full` (derived from tainted data)
- `TEE_ReadObjectData(h, value, value_sz, count)` (tainted operation)
  - `value` (tainted) is populated based on the data read from persistent storage.
- If any of the above operations fail, the function logs an error and returns an error code.

### Conclusion:
The `read_value` function processes tainted data from the `name` parameter to derive the full object name and subsequently reads data into the `value` parameter. The function's behavior is contingent on the success of these operations, which are sensitive to the content of the tainted `name`. The flow of tainted data is critical for understanding how data is retrieved from persistent storage and the potential implications for security and data integrity.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `get_named_object_name` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. This function constructs a full object name by concatenating a prefix with the provided object name.

### Taint Source:
- The new taint source is the `name_orig` parameter, which is the original name provided to the function. The `name` parameter is also marked as a taint label since it is where the constructed full object name will be stored.

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Length Check**:
   - The function first checks if the combined length of `name_orig` and the prefix (`named_value_prefix`) exceeds the maximum allowed length (`TEE_OBJECT_ID_MAX_LEN`). If it does, it returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This operation does not involve tainted data but ensures that the function does not proceed with invalid input.

2. **Constructing the Full Object Name**:
   - The function uses `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len);` to copy the prefix into the `name` buffer. This operation is not tainted as it uses a constant prefix.
   - It then concatenates the provided object name by calling `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size);`. This operation uses the tainted `name_orig` parameter to fill in the rest of the `name` buffer.

3. **Setting the Name Size**:
   - The function sets the size of the constructed name by calculating `*name_size = name_orig_size + pref_len;`. This operation is based on the tainted `name_orig_size`.

4. **Return Value**:
   - If all operations are successful, the function returns `TEE_SUCCESS`.

### Data Flow Summary:
- `name_orig` (tainted) → `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)` (tainted operation)
- `name_size` is set based on the tainted `name_orig_size`.

### Conclusion:
The `get_named_object_name` function processes tainted data from the `name_orig` parameter to construct a full object name. While the prefix is constant and not tainted, the final object name is influenced by the tainted input. The function ensures that the combined length does not exceed the maximum allowed size, which is a critical validation step. The flow of tainted data is essential for understanding how object names are constructed and the potential implications for security and data integrity in subsequent operations that rely on this constructed name.

Since the implementation of `TEE_MemMove` is not provided, we will analyze its role in the context of the taint analysis based on its usage in the previous functions. The `TEE_MemMove` function is typically used for copying memory from one location to another, and it is crucial to understand how it interacts with tainted data.

### Taint Source:
- The new taint source is the `arg1` parameter, which represents the destination buffer in the `TEE_MemMove` function. The source buffer and the size of the data being moved are also relevant but are not marked as taint sources in this context.

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Memory Copying**:
   - The `TEE_MemMove` function is called in the following contexts:
     - **In `get_named_object_name`**:
       - `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len);` (not tainted, as it uses a constant prefix)
       - `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size);` (tainted operation)
         - Here, `name_orig` is the tainted source, and `name` is the destination buffer. The data being copied into `name` is influenced by the tainted `name_orig`.
     - **In `write_persist_value`**:
       - `TEE_MemMove(value, params[1].memref.buffer, value_sz);` (tainted operation)
         - In this case, `params[1].memref.buffer` is the tainted source, and `value` is the destination buffer. The data being copied into `value` is influenced by the tainted input from the `params` array.

2. **Implications of Tainted Data**:
   - The use of `TEE_MemMove` to copy data from tainted sources (like `name_orig` and `params[1].memref.buffer`) into destination buffers (like `name` and `value`) means that any subsequent operations on these destination buffers will also be influenced by the tainted data.
   - If the destination buffers are used in further operations (e.g., writing to persistent storage, processing, etc.), the integrity and security of those operations may be compromised if the tainted data is not properly validated or sanitized.

### Data Flow Summary:
- In `get_named_object_name`:
  - `name_orig` (tainted) → `name + pref_len` (destination buffer) via `TEE_MemMove` (tainted operation)
- In `write_persist_value`:
  - `params[1].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `value` (destination buffer) via `TEE_MemMove` (tainted operation)

### Conclusion:
The `TEE_MemMove` function plays a critical role in the flow of tainted data within the application. It is responsible for copying data from tainted sources into destination buffers, which can lead to potential vulnerabilities if the tainted data is not properly handled. The analysis highlights the importance of ensuring that any data copied into buffers is validated and sanitized to prevent unintended consequences in subsequent operations. The flow of tainted data through `TEE_MemMove` is essential for understanding the overall security posture of the application.

Based on the provided Trusted Application C code snippet, we can analyze the data flow with respect to the taint source and the taint label. The taint source is the `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` function, and the taint label is associated with the `param_types` and `params` parameters.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The function `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` is invoked with parameters:
     - `cmd`: Command identifier (not tainted)
     - `pt`: Parameter type (tainted)
     - `params`: Array of parameters (tainted)

2. **Tainted Parameters**:
   - The `params` array is marked as tainted, which means any data passed through this array can potentially be influenced by untrusted sources.

3. **Command Handling**:
   - The function uses a switch statement to handle different commands based on the value of `cmd`. Each case corresponds to a different command that processes the tainted `params`.

4. **Data Flow for Each Command**:
   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Calls `read_persist_value(pt, params)`.
     - Tainted data flow: `params` (tainted) is passed to `read_persist_value`.
   
   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Calls `write_persist_value(pt, params)`.
     - Tainted data flow: `params` (tainted) is passed to `write_persist_value`.
   
   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Calls `delete_persist_value(pt, params)`.
     - Tainted data flow: `params` (tainted) is passed to `delete_persist_value`.

5. **Default Case**:
   - If `cmd` does not match any of the defined cases, an error message is logged, and the function returns `TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`. No tainted data flow occurs in this case.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` → `read_persist_value(pt, params)` (if `cmd` is `TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE`)
  - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` → `write_persist_value(pt, params)` (if `cmd` is `TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE`)
  - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` → `delete_persist_value(pt, params)` (if `cmd` is `TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE`)

In conclusion, the tainted data from `params` is propagated to the respective command handling functions, which may further process or utilize this tainted data. It is crucial to ensure that these functions handle the tainted data securely to prevent potential vulnerabilities.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `write_persist_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations.

### Taint Source and Taint Label

- **New Taint Source**: The function `write_persist_value` is now the new taint source.
- **Taint Label**: The `params` parameter is marked as the taint label, which is an array of `TEE_Param` structures.

### Tainted Data Operations

1. **Parameter Type Check**:
   - The function first checks if the `pt` parameter matches the expected parameter types (`exp_pt`).
   - If it does not match, it returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. No tainted data flow occurs here.

2. **Extracting Tainted Data**:
   - `name_buf` is assigned from `params[0].memref.buffer`, which is tainted.
   - `name_buf_sz` is assigned from `params[0].memref.size`, which is also tainted.
   - `value_sz` is assigned from `params[1].memref.size`, which is tainted.
   - `value` is allocated using `TEE_Malloc(value_sz, 0)`, and if successful, it will hold tainted data.

3. **Validation of Tainted Data**:
   - The function calls `check_valid_value(name_buf)`, which checks the validity of the tainted `name_buf`. If it fails, an error message is logged, and the function returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This operation does not propagate taint but validates it.

4. **Overwrite Protection**:
   - The function checks if `name_buf` starts with a vendor prefix or the `ROLLBACK_PROT` string. If so, it sets `overwrite` to `false`. This is a control flow based on tainted data.

5. **Memory Operations**:
   - The function allocates memory for `value` and uses `TEE_MemMove(value, params[1].memref.buffer, value_sz)` to copy tainted data from `params[1].memref.buffer` to `value`. This operation propagates taint from `params[1]` to `value`.

6. **Conditional Logic**:
   - The function checks if `name_buf` starts with the vendor prefix and whether `CFG_FIOVB_VENDOR_CREATE` is enabled. If not, it sets `res` to `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS` and logs an error message. This is another control flow based on tainted data.
   - If `name_buf` does not match `BOOTFIRM_VER`, it calls `write_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, overwrite)`, propagating tainted data to this function.
   - If it matches `BOOTFIRM_VER`, it calls `increase_boot_firmware(value, value_sz)`, also propagating tainted data.

7. **Memory Cleanup**:
   - The function calls `TEE_Free(value)` to free the allocated memory, which is a safe operation as it does not affect taint.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `params[0].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `name_buf`
  - `params[0].memref.size` (tainted) → `name_buf_sz`
  - `params[1].memref.size` (tainted) → `value_sz`
  - `params[1].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `value` (via `TEE_MemMove`)
  - `name_buf` (tainted) → `check_valid_value(name_buf)`
  - `name_buf`, `name_buf_sz`, `value`, `value_sz` (tainted) → `write_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, overwrite)`
  - `value` (tainted) → `increase_boot_firmware(value, value_sz)`

### Conclusion

The `write_persist_value` function processes tainted data from the `params` parameter, performing various checks and operations that depend on the tainted values. It is crucial to ensure that all operations involving tainted data are handled securely to prevent vulnerabilities, especially when writing persistent values.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `increase_boot_firmware` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations.

### Taint Source and Taint Label

- **New Taint Source**: The function `increase_boot_firmware` is now the new taint source.
- **Taint Label**: The parameters `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` are marked as the taint label, which are derived from the tainted data in the previous function (`write_persist_value`).

### Tainted Data Operations

1. **Parameter Usage**:
   - `new_ver_str` is a pointer to a character array (string) that is tainted, as it is passed from the `write_persist_value` function.
   - `new_ver_sz` is a `uint32_t` that represents the size of the new version string, which is also tainted.

2. **Rollback Protection Check**:
   - The function first checks if the system is rollback protected by calling `is_rollback_protected()`. This function does not affect taint but is a control flow check.
   - It then checks if the new version string is incremental by calling `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)`. This function also does not affect taint but is another control flow check based on tainted data.

3. **Error Handling**:
   - If the rollback protection is active and the version is not incremental, an error message is logged, and the function returns `TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED`. This operation does not propagate taint but validates the conditions under which the function can proceed.

4. **Writing the New Version**:
   - If the checks pass, the function calls `write_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, new_ver_str, new_ver_sz, true)`.
   - Here, `BOOTFIRM_VER` is a constant string representing the key for the boot firmware version.
   - The `new_ver_str` (tainted) and `new_ver_sz` (tainted) are passed to `write_value`, propagating the taint to this function.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `new_ver_str` (tainted) → `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)`
  - `new_ver_sz` (tainted) → `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)`
  - If checks pass, `new_ver_str` (tainted) and `new_ver_sz` (tainted) → `write_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, new_ver_str, new_ver_sz, true)`

### Conclusion

The `increase_boot_firmware` function processes tainted data from the `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` parameters. It performs checks to ensure that the firmware version update adheres to rollback protection rules before proceeding to write the new version. The tainted data is propagated to the `write_value` function, which will handle the actual writing of the new firmware version. As with previous functions, it is essential to ensure that all operations involving tainted data are handled securely to prevent vulnerabilities.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `is_version_incremental` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations.

### Taint Source and Taint Label

- **New Taint Source**: The function `is_version_incremental` is now the new taint source.
- **Taint Label**: The parameters `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` are marked as the taint label, which are derived from the tainted data in the previous function (`increase_boot_firmware`).

### Tainted Data Operations

1. **Parameter Usage**:
   - `new_ver_str` is a pointer to a character array (string) that is tainted, as it is passed from the `increase_boot_firmware` function.
   - `new_ver_sz` is a `uint32_t` that represents the size of the new version string, which is also tainted.

2. **Reading Current Version**:
   - The function calls `read_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, value, MAX_SIMPLE_VALUE_SIZE, &count)`.
   - This function attempts to read the current boot firmware version into the `value` buffer. The result of this operation is stored in `res`.
   - If `res` indicates that the item was not found (`TEE_ERROR_ITEM_NOT_FOUND`), a message is logged, and the function returns `true`, indicating that the version can be updated. This operation does not propagate taint but validates the condition.

3. **Version Comparison**:
   - If `res` is `TEE_SUCCESS`, the function converts the current version (stored in `value`) and the new version (from `new_ver_str`) to unsigned long integers using `strtoul`.
   - The conversion of `new_ver_str` (tainted) to `new_ver` propagates the taint.
   - The function logs the current and new version numbers for debugging purposes.
   - It then checks if `new_ver` is greater than or equal to `current_ver`. If this condition is met, the function returns `true`, indicating that the version update is valid.

4. **Return False**:
   - If none of the conditions for a valid update are met, the function returns `false`, indicating that the version update is not permitted.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `new_ver_str` (tainted) → `strtoul(new_ver_str, NULL, 10)` → `new_ver`
  - `value` (not tainted, but derived from a previous operation) → `strtoul(value, NULL, 10)` → `current_ver`

### Conclusion

The `is_version_incremental` function processes tainted data from the `new_ver_str` parameter. It reads the current boot firmware version and compares it with the new version to determine if the update is valid. The tainted data is propagated through the conversion to an unsigned long integer. The function ensures that the new version is greater than or equal to the current version before allowing the update. As with previous functions, it is essential to ensure that all operations involving tainted data are handled securely to prevent vulnerabilities.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `read_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations.

### Taint Source and Taint Label

- **New Taint Source**: The function `read_value` is now the new taint source.
- **Taint Label**: The parameters `name`, `name_sz`, `value`, `value_sz`, and `count` are marked as the taint label, which are derived from the tainted data in the previous function (`is_version_incremental`).

### Tainted Data Operations

1. **Parameter Usage**:
   - `name` is a pointer to a character array (string) that is tainted, as it is passed from the `BOOTFIRM_VER` constant in the previous function.
   - `name_sz` is a `uint32_t` that represents the size of the name string, which is also tainted.
   - `value` is a pointer to a character array where the read data will be stored, and it is tainted as it will be filled with data from the persistent storage.
   - `value_sz` is a `uint32_t` that represents the size of the buffer for the value, which is tainted.
   - `count` is a pointer to a `uint32_t` that will hold the number of bytes read, which is also tainted as it will be modified by the function.

2. **Getting the Full Object Name**:
   - The function calls `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)`.
   - This function attempts to generate a full object name based on the provided `name` and `name_sz`. The result is stored in `name_full` and `name_full_sz`.
   - If `res` is non-zero, the function returns the error code. This operation does not propagate taint but validates the condition.

3. **Opening the Persistent Object**:
   - The function calls `TEE_OpenPersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, &h)`.
   - This function attempts to open a persistent object in storage using the full name. If it fails, an error message is logged, and the function returns the error code. This operation does not propagate taint but is a critical step in accessing the data.

4. **Reading Object Data**:
   - The function calls `TEE_ReadObjectData(h, value, value_sz, count)`.
   - This function reads data from the opened object into the `value` buffer. The `value` parameter is tainted, and the data read into it will also be considered tainted.
   - If the read operation fails, an error message is logged, and the function returns the error code. This operation propagates taint from the persistent storage to the `value` buffer.

5. **Closing the Object**:
   - The function calls `TEE_CloseObject(h)` to close the handle to the persistent object. This operation does not affect taint.

6. **Return Value**:
   - The function returns the result of the read operation, which indicates success or failure.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `name` (tainted) → `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)`
  - `name_sz` (tainted) → `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)`
  - `value` (tainted) → `TEE_ReadObjectData(h, value, value_sz, count)` (data read into `value` is tainted)
  - `value_sz` (tainted) → `TEE_ReadObjectData(h, value, value_sz, count)`
  - `count` (tainted) → `TEE_ReadObjectData(h, value, value_sz, count)` (modified by the function)

### Conclusion

The `read_value` function processes tainted data from the `name`, `name_sz`, `value`, `value_sz`, and `count` parameters. It attempts to read a value from persistent storage based on the provided name. The tainted data is propagated into the `value` buffer, which will contain potentially sensitive information. As with previous functions, it is essential to ensure that all operations involving tainted data are handled securely to prevent vulnerabilities, especially when dealing with persistent storage.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `get_named_object_name` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations.

### Taint Source and Taint Label

- **New Taint Source**: The function `get_named_object_name` is now the new taint source.
- **Taint Label**: The parameters `name_orig`, `name_orig_size`, `name`, and `name_size` are marked as the taint label, which are derived from the tainted data in the previous function (`read_value`).

### Tainted Data Operations

1. **Parameter Usage**:
   - `name_orig` is a pointer to a character array (string) that is tainted, as it is passed from the `name` parameter in the `read_value` function.
   - `name_orig_size` is a `uint32_t` that represents the size of the original name string, which is also tainted.
   - `name` is a pointer to a character array where the full object name will be constructed, and it is tainted as it will be filled with data.
   - `name_size` is a pointer to a `uint32_t` that will hold the size of the constructed name, which is also tainted as it will be modified by the function.

2. **Length Check**:
   - The function first checks if the combined length of `name_orig_size` and the length of `named_value_prefix` exceeds `TEE_OBJECT_ID_MAX_LEN`.
   - If it does, the function returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This operation does not propagate taint but validates the input parameters.

3. **Constructing the Full Object Name**:
   - The function uses `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len)` to copy the prefix into the `name` buffer. This operation does not propagate taint as the prefix is a constant.
   - It then concatenates the provided object name by using `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)`. This operation copies the tainted `name_orig` into the `name` buffer, propagating the taint.

4. **Setting the Name Size**:
   - The function sets `*name_size` to the total length of the constructed name (`name_orig_size + pref_len`). This operation modifies the value pointed to by `name_size`, which is also tainted.

5. **Return Value**:
   - The function returns `TEE_SUCCESS`, indicating that the operation was successful.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `name_orig` (tainted) → `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)` (data copied into `name`)
  - `name_orig_size` (tainted) → `*name_size = name_orig_size + pref_len` (modified by the function)

### Conclusion

The `get_named_object_name` function processes tainted data from the `name_orig` and `name_orig_size` parameters. It constructs a full object name by concatenating a predefined prefix with the original name. The tainted data is propagated into the `name` buffer, which will be used in subsequent operations. As with previous functions, it is essential to ensure that all operations involving tainted data are handled securely to prevent vulnerabilities, especially when constructing identifiers for persistent storage.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `TEE_MemMove` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and tainted data operations. Since the implementation of `TEE_MemMove` is not provided, we will analyze it based on its expected behavior as a memory manipulation function.

### Taint Source and Taint Label

- **New Taint Source**: The function `TEE_MemMove` is now the new taint source.
- **Taint Label**: The first argument (`arg1`) of `TEE_MemMove` is marked as the taint label, which represents the destination buffer where data will be copied.

### Tainted Data Operations

1. **Parameter Usage**:
   - The first argument (`arg1`) is the destination buffer where data will be copied. This buffer can be tainted if the source of the data being copied is tainted.
   - The second argument is the source buffer from which data is copied. If this buffer is tainted, the destination buffer will also become tainted after the operation.
   - The third argument is the size of the data to be copied, which determines how much data will be transferred.

2. **Tainted Data Flow**:
   - When `TEE_MemMove` is called, the taint can propagate from the source buffer to the destination buffer. If the source buffer contains tainted data, the destination buffer will also contain tainted data after the operation.
   - In the context of the previous functions, `TEE_MemMove` was used to copy data from `named_value_prefix` (which is constant and not tainted) and `name_orig` (which is tainted) into the `name` buffer. Therefore, the taint propagation occurs as follows:
     - If `name_orig` is tainted, then after the call to `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)`, the `name` buffer will also be tainted.

3. **Return Value**:
   - The return value of `TEE_MemMove` is not specified in the provided code, but typically, memory manipulation functions do not return a value indicating success or failure. Instead, they either complete the operation or may cause undefined behavior if the parameters are invalid.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `arg1` (destination buffer) becomes tainted if the source buffer (second argument) is tainted.
  - In the context of the previous function:
    - `name` (destination buffer) becomes tainted after the operation if `name_orig` (source buffer) is tainted.

### Conclusion

The `TEE_MemMove` function is a critical operation for copying data between buffers. It propagates taint from the source buffer to the destination buffer. In the context of the previous functions, it is essential to ensure that the source buffer does not contain untrusted or malicious data, as this could lead to vulnerabilities in the application. Proper validation and sanitization of data before it is copied are crucial to maintaining the integrity and security of the application.

Based on the provided Trusted Application C code snippet, we can analyze the data flow with respect to the taint source and the taint label. The taint source is the `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` function, specifically the parameters it receives, and the taint label is associated with the `param_types` and `params` parameters.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The function `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` is invoked with parameters:
     - `cmd`: Command identifier (uint32_t)
     - `pt`: Parameter type (uint32_t)
     - `params`: Array of TEE_Param structures (taint label)

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The `params` parameter is marked as tainted data. This means any operations that involve `params` or its contents can potentially propagate the taint.

3. **Command Handling**:
   - The `cmd` parameter is used in a switch statement to determine which command to execute. The commands are:
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE`
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE`
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE`
   - Each case calls a corresponding function (`read_persist_value`, `write_persist_value`, `delete_persist_value`) and passes the `pt` and `params` parameters.

4. **Data Flow Paths**:
   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Tainted Data Flow: 
       - `params` (tainted) → `read_persist_value(pt, params)`
   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Tainted Data Flow:
       - `params` (tainted) → `write_persist_value(pt, params)`
   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Tainted Data Flow:
       - `params` (tainted) → `delete_persist_value(pt, params)`

5. **Default Case**:
   - If the command is not supported, an error message is logged, and `TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED` is returned. There is no taint propagation in this case since no operations on `params` occur.

### Summary of Data Flows
- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` → `read_persist_value(pt, params)` (if `cmd` is `TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE`)
  - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` → `write_persist_value(pt, params)` (if `cmd` is `TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE`)
  - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` → `delete_persist_value(pt, params)` (if `cmd` is `TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE`)

In conclusion, the `params` parameter is the source of tainted data, and it flows into the respective command handling functions based on the value of `cmd`. Each of these functions may further process the tainted data, depending on their implementations.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `write_persist_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and any tainted data operations.

### Taint Source and Taint Label
- **New Taint Source**: The function `write_persist_value` is now the new taint source.
- **Taint Label**: The `params` parameter is marked as a taint label, which contains the input data for the function.

### Tainted Data Operations
1. **Parameter Validation**:
   - The function first checks if the `pt` parameter matches the expected parameter types (`exp_pt`). If not, it returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This does not propagate taint but ensures that the function only processes valid input.

2. **Data Aliasing**:
   - `name_buf` is assigned from `params[0].memref.buffer`, which is tainted data.
   - `name_buf_sz` is assigned from `params[0].memref.size`, which is also derived from tainted data.
   - `value` is allocated memory based on `params[1].memref.size`, which is tainted data.

3. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - **Check Validity**:
     - The function calls `check_valid_value(name_buf)`, which operates on the tainted `name_buf`. If this function returns an error, it logs an error message and returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`.
   - **Overwrite Check**:
     - The function checks if `name_buf` starts with a vendor prefix or the `ROLLBACK_PROT` string. If it does, the `overwrite` flag is set to `false`. This operation does not propagate taint but is a conditional check based on tainted data.
   - **Memory Allocation**:
     - `value` is allocated using `TEE_Malloc(value_sz, 0)`, where `value_sz` is derived from `params[1].memref.size`. If allocation fails, it returns `TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY`.
   - **Data Movement**:
     - The function uses `TEE_MemMove(value, params[1].memref.buffer, value_sz)` to copy data from the tainted `params[1].memref.buffer` to the newly allocated `value`. This operation propagates the taint from `params[1]` to `value`.
   - **Conditional Logic**:
     - The function checks if `name_buf` starts with the vendor prefix and whether the configuration allows creating vendor variables. If not allowed, it logs an error and sets `res` to `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`.
     - If `name_buf` does not match `BOOTFIRM_VER`, it calls `write_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, overwrite)`, which operates on tainted data (`name_buf`, `value`, etc.).
     - If it matches `BOOTFIRM_VER`, it calls `increase_boot_firmware(value, value_sz)`, which also operates on tainted data (`value`).

4. **Memory Deallocation**:
   - The function calls `TEE_Free(value)` to free the allocated memory, which does not affect taint but is a good practice for resource management.

### Summary of Data Flows
- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `params[0].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `name_buf`
  - `params[0].memref.size` (tainted) → `name_buf_sz`
  - `params[1].memref.size` (tainted) → `value_sz`
  - `params[1].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `value` (after `TEE_Malloc`)
  - `value` (tainted) → `TEE_MemMove(value, params[1].memref.buffer, value_sz)`
  - `name_buf` (tainted) → `check_valid_value(name_buf)`
  - `name_buf`, `name_buf_sz`, `value`, `value_sz`, `overwrite` (tainted) → `write_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, overwrite)`
  - `value` (tainted) → `increase_boot_firmware(value, value_sz)`

In conclusion, the `write_persist_value` function processes tainted data from the `params` parameter, propagating the taint through various operations, including memory allocation, data movement, and function calls. The function ensures that only valid and allowed operations are performed based on the tainted input.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `increase_boot_firmware` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and any tainted data operations.

### Taint Source and Taint Label
- **New Taint Source**: The function `increase_boot_firmware` is now the new taint source.
- **Taint Label**: The parameters `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` are marked as taint labels, which contain the input data for the function.

### Tainted Data Operations
1. **Parameter Usage**:
   - `new_ver_str` is a pointer to a character array (string) that is expected to contain the new version string.
   - `new_ver_sz` is a `uint32_t` representing the size of the new version string.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - **Rollback Protection Check**:
     - The function first checks if rollback protection is enabled by calling `is_rollback_protected()`. This function does not operate on tainted data but is a condition that may affect subsequent operations.
     - If rollback protection is enabled, it checks if the new version string is incremental by calling `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)`. This operation uses tainted data (`new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz`). If this check fails, it logs an error message and returns `TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED`.
   - **Writing the New Version**:
     - If the checks pass, the function calls `write_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, new_ver_str, new_ver_sz, true)`. This operation propagates the taint from `new_ver_str` to the `write_value` function, along with the constant `BOOTFIRM_VER` and its length.

### Summary of Data Flows
- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `new_ver_str` (tainted) → `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)`
  - `new_ver_sz` (tainted) → `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)`
  - If checks pass:
    - `new_ver_str` (tainted) → `write_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, new_ver_str, new_ver_sz, true)`

### Conclusion
The `increase_boot_firmware` function processes tainted data from its parameters, propagating the taint through the rollback protection checks and the call to `write_value`. The function ensures that the new firmware version can only be updated if it meets the specified conditions, thus maintaining the integrity of the firmware versioning process. The taint analysis shows that the tainted data is carefully managed and checked before any critical operations are performed.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `write_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and any tainted data operations.

### Taint Source and Taint Label
- **New Taint Source**: The function `write_value` is now the new taint source.
- **Taint Label**: The parameters `name`, `name_sz`, `value`, `value_sz`, and `overwrite` are marked as taint labels, which contain the input data for the function.

### Tainted Data Operations
1. **Parameter Usage**:
   - `name`: A pointer to a character array (string) representing the name of the object to be written.
   - `name_sz`: A `uint32_t` representing the size of the name string.
   - `value`: A pointer to a character array (string) representing the value to be written.
   - `value_sz`: A `uint32_t` representing the size of the value string.
   - `overwrite`: A boolean flag indicating whether to overwrite an existing object.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - **Flags Initialization**:
     - The `flags` variable is initialized based on the configuration. If `CFG_FIOVB_VENDOR_CREATE` is defined, it includes read and write access flags. If `overwrite` is true, additional flags for write access and overwrite are added. The `flags` variable itself does not propagate taint but is influenced by the `overwrite` parameter.
   - **Get Named Object Name**:
     - The function calls `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)`, which uses tainted data (`name` and `name_sz`). If this function returns an error, it propagates the error back to the caller.
   - **Create Persistent Object**:
     - The function calls `TEE_CreatePersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, NULL, value, value_sz, &h)`. This operation uses tainted data:
       - `name_full` and `name_full_sz` (derived from tainted `name` and `name_sz`)
       - `value` and `value_sz` (tainted data)
     - If the operation fails due to an access conflict, it logs an error message. If it fails for any other reason, it logs a different error message. Both error messages reference the tainted `name`.
   - **Close Object**:
     - The function calls `TEE_CloseObject(h)` to close the object handle. This operation does not affect taint but is important for resource management.

### Summary of Data Flows
- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `name` (tainted) → `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)`
  - `name_sz` (tainted) → `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)`
  - `value` (tainted) → `TEE_CreatePersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, NULL, value, value_sz, &h)`
  - `value_sz` (tainted) → `TEE_CreatePersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, NULL, value, value_sz, &h)`

### Conclusion
The `write_value` function processes tainted data from its parameters, propagating the taint through the calls to `get_named_object_name` and `TEE_CreatePersistentObject`. The function ensures that the object is created or updated based on the provided parameters, while also handling potential errors related to access conflicts. The taint analysis shows that the function carefully manages tainted data, ensuring that only valid and allowed operations are performed based on the input parameters.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `get_named_object_name` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and any tainted data operations.

### Taint Source and Taint Label
- **New Taint Source**: The function `get_named_object_name` is now the new taint source.
- **Taint Label**: The parameters `name_orig`, `name_orig_size`, `name`, and `name_size` are marked as taint labels, which contain the input data for the function.

### Tainted Data Operations
1. **Parameter Usage**:
   - `name_orig`: A pointer to a character array (string) representing the original name of the object.
   - `name_orig_size`: A `uint32_t` representing the size of the original name string.
   - `name`: A pointer to a character array where the concatenated name will be stored.
   - `name_size`: A pointer to a `uint32_t` where the size of the concatenated name will be stored.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - **Length Check**:
     - The function first checks if the combined length of `name_orig_size` and the length of `named_value_prefix` exceeds `TEE_OBJECT_ID_MAX_LEN`. If it does, it returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This check does not propagate taint but ensures that the function only processes valid input.
   - **Memory Operations**:
     - The function uses `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len)` to copy the prefix into the `name` buffer. This operation does not involve tainted data since `named_value_prefix` is a constant.
     - The function then uses `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)` to concatenate the original name (`name_orig`) to the end of the prefix. This operation propagates the taint from `name_orig` to the `name` buffer.
   - **Size Assignment**:
     - The function assigns the total size of the concatenated name to `*name_size`, which is derived from tainted data (`name_orig_size`).

### Summary of Data Flows
- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `name_orig` (tainted) → `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)`
  - `name_orig_size` (tainted) → `*name_size = name_orig_size + pref_len`

### Conclusion
The `get_named_object_name` function processes tainted data from its parameters, specifically the `name_orig` and `name_orig_size`. The function constructs a new name by concatenating a prefix with the original name, propagating the taint from `name_orig` to the resulting `name`. The function ensures that the combined length does not exceed the maximum allowed size, maintaining the integrity of the name being constructed. The taint analysis shows that the function carefully manages tainted data, ensuring that only valid and allowed operations are performed based on the input parameters.

Since the implementation of `TEE_MemMove` is not provided, we will analyze its role in the context of taint analysis based on its usage in the previous functions. We will treat `TEE_MemMove` as a new taint source and analyze how it interacts with tainted data.

### Taint Source and Taint Label
- **New Taint Source**: The function `TEE_MemMove` is now the new taint source.
- **Taint Label**: The first argument (`arg1`) of `TEE_MemMove` is marked as a taint label, which represents the destination buffer where data is being copied.

### Tainted Data Operations
1. **Parameter Usage**:
   - `arg1`: This is the destination buffer where data is copied to. The taint status of this buffer will depend on the source of the data being copied into it.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - **Data Copying**:
     - In the context of the previous functions, `TEE_MemMove` is used to copy data from one buffer to another. The taint status of `arg1` will depend on the source buffer:
       - When `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len)` is called, `arg1` (which is `name`) is not tainted because `named_value_prefix` is a constant.
       - When `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)` is called, `arg1` (which is `name + pref_len`) becomes tainted because the source buffer `name_orig` is tainted. Thus, the taint propagates from `name_orig` to `name + pref_len`.

### Summary of Data Flows
- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - For the first call:
    - `named_value_prefix` (not tainted) → `name` (not tainted)
  - For the second call:
    - `name_orig` (tainted) → `name + pref_len` (tainted)

### Conclusion
The `TEE_MemMove` function is a critical operation for copying data between buffers. In the context of taint analysis, it is important to track the taint status of both the source and destination buffers. The destination buffer (`arg1`) will inherit the taint status from the source buffer. In the analyzed functions, the taint propagates from `name_orig` to the concatenated `name` buffer, indicating that any data copied into `name` from a tainted source will also be tainted. This highlights the importance of managing tainted data carefully, especially when using memory operations like `TEE_MemMove`.

Based on the provided Trusted Application C code snippet, we can analyze the data flow related to the taint source and the tainted parameters. The taint source in this case is the `cmd` parameter passed to the `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` function, and the `params` array is marked as the taint label.

Here are the data flows extracted from the code:

1. **Taint Source**:
   - `cmd` is the taint source, which is an input parameter to the function.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The `cmd` parameter is used in a switch statement to determine which command to execute. Each case corresponds to a different command that may operate on the `params` array.

3. **Data Flows**:
   - **Flow 1**: 
     - `cmd` (tainted) → `TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE` (case) → `read_persist_value(pt, params)`
     - The `params` array is passed to the `read_persist_value` function, which may operate on the tainted data.

   - **Flow 2**: 
     - `cmd` (tainted) → `TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE` (case) → `write_persist_value(pt, params)`
     - The `params` array is passed to the `write_persist_value` function, which may operate on the tainted data.

   - **Flow 3**: 
     - `cmd` (tainted) → `TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE` (case) → `delete_persist_value(pt, params)`
     - The `params` array is passed to the `delete_persist_value` function, which may operate on the tainted data.

4. **Default Case**:
   - If `cmd` does not match any of the defined cases, it falls into the default case, which does not affect the taint flow but logs an error message.

In summary, the taint data flow can be summarized as follows:

- `cmd` (tainted) influences the execution path leading to the invocation of `read_persist_value`, `write_persist_value`, or `delete_persist_value`, all of which operate on the `params` array (tainted). The taint from `cmd` propagates to the `params` in each of these function calls.

Continuing the taint analysis based on the new taint source from the `read_persist_value` function, we will identify the taint propagation, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The `params` parameter is marked as the taint label, and we will analyze how the taint flows through this function.

### Taint Source:
- The new taint source is the `params` array, which is passed to the `read_persist_value` function.

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Parameter Validation**:
   - The function first checks if the `pt` parameter matches the expected parameter types (`exp_pt`). If it does not match, it returns an error (`TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`). This check does not affect the taint flow.

2. **Data Aliases**:
   - `name_buf` is assigned from `params[0].memref.buffer`, which is tainted.
   - `name_buf_sz` is assigned from `params[0].memref.size`, which is also tainted.
   - `value` is allocated memory based on `params[1].memref.size`, which is tainted.

3. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - **Flow 1**: 
     - `params[0].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `name_buf` (tainted)
     - `params[0].memref.size` (tainted) → `name_buf_sz` (tainted)
     - The `check_valid_value(name_buf)` function is called with `name_buf` (tainted). If this function uses the buffer in a way that could lead to security issues, it is important to ensure that it properly validates the input.

   - **Flow 2**: 
     - `params[1].memref.size` (tainted) → `value_sz` (tainted)
     - Memory is allocated for `value` using `TEE_Malloc(value_sz, 0)`. If `value_sz` is derived from tainted data, the allocated memory is also considered tainted.

   - **Flow 3**: 
     - The function `read_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, &count)` is called. The parameters `name_buf` and `name_buf_sz` are tainted, and the `value` buffer is also tainted since it was allocated based on tainted data. The `count` variable may be modified by this function, but its taint status depends on the implementation of `read_value`.

   - **Flow 4**: 
     - `TEE_MemMove(params[1].memref.buffer, value, value_sz)` moves the contents of the tainted `value` buffer to `params[1].memref.buffer`, which is also tainted. This operation propagates the taint from `value` to `params[1].memref.buffer`.

   - **Flow 5**: 
     - `params[1].memref.size` is updated with `count`, which may be influenced by the tainted data from `value`. If `count` is derived from tainted data, this operation propagates the taint to `params[1].memref.size`.

4. **Memory Management**:
   - `TEE_Free(value)` is called to free the allocated memory. This operation does not affect the taint flow but is important for resource management.

### Summary of Taint Data Flow:
- The taint from `params` propagates through the `read_persist_value` function as follows:
  - `params[0].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `name_buf` (tainted)
  - `params[0].memref.size` (tainted) → `name_buf_sz` (tainted)
  - `params[1].memref.size` (tainted) → `value_sz` (tainted) → `value` (tainted)
  - `name_buf` and `name_buf_sz` (tainted) are used in `check_valid_value` and `read_value`, which may further propagate taint.
  - `value` (tainted) is moved to `params[1].memref.buffer` (tainted).
  - `count` (potentially tainted) is assigned to `params[1].memref.size` (tainted).

In conclusion, the taint from the `params` array is propagated through various operations in the `read_persist_value` function, affecting multiple variables and potentially leading to security vulnerabilities if not properly validated.

Continuing the taint analysis based on the new taint source from the `read_value` function, we will identify the taint propagation, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The `params` parameter is still marked as the taint label, and we will analyze how the taint flows through this function.

### Taint Source:
- The new taint source is the `params` array, which is passed indirectly through the `name`, `value`, and `count` parameters.

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Parameter Aliases**:
   - `name` is assigned from `params[0].memref.buffer` (tainted).
   - `name_sz` is assigned from `params[0].memref.size` (tainted).
   - `value` is assigned from `params[1].memref.buffer` (tainted).
   - `value_sz` is assigned from `params[1].memref.size` (tainted).
   - `count` is a pointer to a variable that may be modified, and its taint status depends on the data it points to.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - **Flow 1**: 
     - `name` (tainted) and `name_sz` (tainted) are passed to `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)`. If this function uses the `name` buffer in an unsafe manner, it could lead to vulnerabilities.
     - The result of this function is stored in `res`, which is checked for errors.

   - **Flow 2**: 
     - `name_full` is populated by `get_named_object_name`, and its taint status depends on the implementation of that function. If `name_full` is derived from tainted data, it remains tainted.
     - `TEE_OpenPersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, &h)` is called with `name_full` (potentially tainted). If this function does not properly validate the input, it could lead to security issues.

   - **Flow 3**: 
     - `TEE_ReadObjectData(h, value, value_sz, count)` is called with `value` (tainted) and `value_sz` (tainted). The `value` buffer is where the read data will be stored, and since it is tainted, any data written to it will also be tainted.
     - The `count` parameter is updated with the number of bytes read, which may also be influenced by tainted data.

3. **Error Handling**:
   - If any of the operations fail, appropriate error messages are logged, but this does not affect the taint flow.

4. **Resource Management**:
   - `TEE_CloseObject(h)` is called to close the persistent object handle. This operation does not affect the taint flow but is important for resource management.

### Summary of Taint Data Flow:
- The taint from `params` propagates through the `read_value` function as follows:
  - `params[0].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `name` (tainted)
  - `params[0].memref.size` (tainted) → `name_sz` (tainted)
  - `params[1].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `value` (tainted)
  - `params[1].memref.size` (tainted) → `value_sz` (tainted)
  - The `count` pointer is passed, which may be modified based on the tainted data read into `value`.

In conclusion, the taint from the `params` array is propagated through various operations in the `read_value` function, affecting multiple variables and potentially leading to security vulnerabilities if not properly validated. The function relies on the integrity of the input parameters and the behavior of the called functions (`get_named_object_name`, `TEE_OpenPersistentObject`, and `TEE_ReadObjectData`) to ensure that the operations are safe and do not introduce vulnerabilities.

Continuing the taint analysis based on the new taint source from the `get_named_object_name` function, we will identify the taint propagation, data aliases, and tainted data operations. The `params` parameter is still marked as the taint label, and we will analyze how the taint flows through this function.

### Taint Source:
- The new taint source is the `name_orig` parameter, which is passed from the `read_value` function and is derived from the `params` array.

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Parameter Aliases**:
   - `name_orig` is assigned from `params[0].memref.buffer` (tainted).
   - `name_orig_size` is assigned from `params[0].memref.size` (tainted).
   - `name` is a buffer that will be populated with the concatenated name.
   - `name_size` is a pointer to a variable that will be updated with the size of the resulting name.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - **Flow 1**: 
     - The function checks if the combined size of `name_orig_size` and the length of `named_value_prefix` exceeds `TEE_OBJECT_ID_MAX_LEN`. If it does, it returns an error (`TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`). This check does not affect the taint flow but ensures that the function does not operate on overly large data.

   - **Flow 2**: 
     - `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len)` copies the prefix into the `name` buffer. The prefix itself is not tainted, but the subsequent operations will depend on the tainted data.
     - `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)` concatenates the tainted `name_orig` (tainted) to the `name` buffer. This operation propagates the taint from `name_orig` to the `name` buffer.

   - **Flow 3**: 
     - The size of the resulting name is calculated and assigned to `*name_size`, which is influenced by the tainted `name_orig_size`. This means that `*name_size` is also tainted.

3. **Return Value**:
   - The function returns `TEE_SUCCESS` if all operations are successful. The return value itself does not affect the taint flow.

### Summary of Taint Data Flow:
- The taint from `params` propagates through the `get_named_object_name` function as follows:
  - `params[0].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `name_orig` (tainted)
  - `params[0].memref.size` (tainted) → `name_orig_size` (tainted)
  - `name_orig` (tainted) is concatenated to `name`, making `name` (tainted).
  - `*name_size` is updated based on the tainted `name_orig_size`, making it tainted as well.

In conclusion, the taint from the `params` array is propagated through the `get_named_object_name` function, affecting multiple variables and potentially leading to security vulnerabilities if not properly validated. The function relies on the integrity of the input parameters and ensures that the resulting name is constructed correctly, but it does not perform any additional validation on the contents of `name_orig`. This could lead to issues if `name_orig` contains unexpected or malicious data.

Continuing the taint analysis based on the new taint source from the `TEE_MemMove` function, we will identify the taint propagation, data aliases, and tainted data operations. Since the implementation of `TEE_MemMove` is unavailable, we will analyze its usage in the context of the previous functions and how it interacts with tainted data.

### Taint Source:
- The new taint source is the `TEE_MemMove` function, which is used to copy data between buffers. The parameters passed to this function will be marked as taint labels.

### Tainted Data Operations:
1. **Parameter Aliases**:
   - In the context of the `get_named_object_name` function, `TEE_MemMove` is called twice:
     - **First Call**: `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len)`
       - `arg1`: `name` (destination buffer) - This buffer will receive the prefix and is initially untainted.
       - `arg2`: `named_value_prefix` (source buffer) - This buffer is not tainted.
       - `arg3`: `pref_len` (size of the prefix) - This is a size parameter and does not affect taint.
     - **Second Call**: `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)`
       - `arg1`: `name + pref_len` (destination buffer) - This buffer will receive the concatenated `name_orig` and is tainted after this operation.
       - `arg2`: `name_orig` (source buffer) - This buffer is tainted as it is derived from `params[0].memref.buffer`.
       - `arg3`: `name_orig_size` (size of the source buffer) - This is a size parameter and is tainted as it is derived from `params[0].memref.size`.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - **Flow 1**: 
     - The first call to `TEE_MemMove` copies the `named_value_prefix` into the `name` buffer. Since `name` is initially untainted, this operation does not propagate taint.
   
   - **Flow 2**: 
     - The second call to `TEE_MemMove` copies the tainted `name_orig` into the `name` buffer (offset by `pref_len`). After this operation, the `name` buffer becomes tainted because it now contains data from the tainted `name_orig`.

3. **Return Value**:
   - The function returns `TEE_SUCCESS` if all operations are successful. The return value itself does not affect the taint flow.

### Summary of Taint Data Flow:
- The taint from `params` propagates through the `TEE_MemMove` function as follows:
  - The first call to `TEE_MemMove` does not affect taint since it copies a non-tainted prefix into an initially untainted buffer.
  - The second call to `TEE_MemMove` propagates the taint from `name_orig` (tainted) to `name` (tainted), making the `name` buffer tainted after the operation.

In conclusion, the `TEE_MemMove` function is critical in managing the taint flow in the `get_named_object_name` function. The first call does not affect taint, but the second call propagates taint from the `params` array to the `name` buffer. This highlights the importance of ensuring that the source buffers passed to `TEE_MemMove` are properly validated to prevent the introduction of malicious or unexpected data into the destination buffers.

Based on the provided Trusted Application C code snippet, we can analyze the data flow with respect to the taint source and the taint label. The taint source is the `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` function, and the taint label is associated with the `param_types` and `params` parameters.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The function `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` is invoked with parameters:
     - `cmd`: Command identifier (not tainted)
     - `pt`: Parameter type (tainted)
     - `params`: Array of parameters (tainted)

2. **Tainted Parameters**:
   - The `params` array is marked as tainted, which means any data passed through this array can potentially be influenced by untrusted sources.

3. **Command Handling**:
   - The function uses a switch statement to handle different commands based on the value of `cmd`. Each case corresponds to a different command that may operate on the tainted `params`.

4. **Data Flow for Each Command**:
   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Calls `read_persist_value(pt, params)`.
     - Tainted data flow: `params` (tainted) is passed to `read_persist_value`.
   
   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Calls `write_persist_value(pt, params)`.
     - Tainted data flow: `params` (tainted) is passed to `write_persist_value`.
   
   - **Case: TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Calls `delete_persist_value(pt, params)`.
     - Tainted data flow: `params` (tainted) is passed to `delete_persist_value`.

5. **Default Case**:
   - If `cmd` does not match any of the defined cases, an error message is logged, and `TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED` is returned. No tainted data flow occurs in this case.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` → `read_persist_value(pt, params)` (if `cmd` is `TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE`)
  - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` → `write_persist_value(pt, params)` (if `cmd` is `TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE`)
  - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` → `delete_persist_value(pt, params)` (if `cmd` is `TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE`)

In conclusion, the tainted data flows from the `params` array into the respective command handling functions, which may further process or utilize this tainted data.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `delete_persist_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and any operations involving tainted data.

### Taint Source and Taint Label

- **New Taint Source**: The function `delete_persist_value` is now the new taint source.
- **Taint Label**: The `params` parameter is marked as tainted, specifically `params[0]`, which is expected to be a memory reference input.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Parameter Validation**:
   - The function first checks if the `pt` (parameter type) matches the expected type (`exp_pt`).
   - If `pt` does not match, it returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. No tainted data flow occurs in this case.

2. **Extracting Tainted Data**:
   - If the parameter type is valid, the function extracts:
     - `name_buf`: A pointer to the buffer from `params[0].memref.buffer` (tainted).
     - `name_buf_sz`: The size of the buffer from `params[0].memref.size` (tainted).

3. **Data Alias**:
   - `name_buf` is an alias for the buffer in `params[0].memref.buffer`. Since `params` is tainted, `name_buf` is also tainted.

4. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The function checks if the content of `name_buf` starts with the string `ROLLBACK_PROT` using `strncmp`.
     - This operation involves tainted data (`name_buf`), and if the condition is true, it returns `TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED`. This prevents the deletion of a specific protected value.
   - If the check passes, the function calls `delete_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz)`, which operates on the tainted data:
     - `delete_value` is invoked with `name_buf` (tainted) and `name_buf_sz` (tainted).

5. **Return Value**:
   - The result of `delete_value` is stored in `res`, which is returned at the end of the function. The taint from `name_buf` and `name_buf_sz` may propagate into `res` depending on the implementation of `delete_value`.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `delete_persist_value` → `params[0].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `name_buf` (tainted)
  - `delete_persist_value` → `params[0].memref.size` (tainted) → `name_buf_sz` (tainted)
  - `delete_persist_value` → `strncmp(name_buf, ROLLBACK_PROT, strlen(ROLLBACK_PROT))` (tainted operation)
  - `delete_persist_value` → `delete_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz)` (tainted operation)

### Conclusion

The `delete_persist_value` function processes tainted data from the `params` parameter, specifically from `params[0]`. The function performs checks and operations that involve this tainted data, which could lead to security implications if not handled properly. The taint analysis indicates that the function is designed to prevent the deletion of sensitive data (e.g., rollback protection) while still allowing other deletions based on the tainted input.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `delete_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and any operations involving tainted data.

### Taint Source and Taint Label

- **New Taint Source**: The function `delete_value` is now the new taint source.
- **Taint Label**: The parameters `name` (a pointer to a character buffer) and `name_sz` (the size of the buffer) are marked as tainted.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Parameter Inputs**:
   - The function takes two parameters:
     - `name`: A pointer to a character buffer (tainted).
     - `name_sz`: The size of the buffer (tainted).

2. **Data Aliases**:
   - The `name` parameter is directly used as a pointer to the buffer that contains the name of the object to be deleted. Since `name` is tainted, any operations on it will also involve tainted data.

3. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The function first calls `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)`, which processes the tainted `name` and `name_sz`:
     - This function may modify `name_full` and `name_full_sz`, but the specifics of how it handles the tainted data depend on its implementation. If it uses `name` in a way that could lead to security issues, it should be carefully reviewed.
     - The result of this operation is stored in `res`. If `res` is non-zero, the function returns early, indicating an error.

4. **Opening the Persistent Object**:
   - The function then attempts to open a persistent object using `TEE_OpenPersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, &h)`:
     - `name_full` is derived from the tainted `name`, and `name_full_sz` is the size of that name.
     - If this operation fails, an error message is logged, and the function returns the error code.

5. **Closing and Deleting the Persistent Object**:
   - If the object is successfully opened, the function calls `TEE_CloseAndDeletePersistentObject1(h)` to close and delete the persistent object:
     - The result of this operation is also stored in `res`, and if it fails, an error message is logged.

6. **Return Value**:
   - The function returns the result of the last operation (`res`), which may reflect the success or failure of the delete operation.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `delete_value` → `name` (tainted) → `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)` (tainted operation)
  - `delete_value` → `name_sz` (tainted) → `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)` (tainted operation)
  - `delete_value` → `name_full` (derived from tainted `name`) → `TEE_OpenPersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, &h)` (tainted operation)
  - `delete_value` → `name_full_sz` (derived from tainted `name_sz`) → `TEE_OpenPersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, &h)` (tainted operation)

### Conclusion

The `delete_value` function processes tainted data from the `name` and `name_sz` parameters. It performs several operations that involve this tainted data, including retrieving the full name of the object to be deleted and attempting to open and delete that object. The taint analysis indicates that the function is designed to handle the deletion of persistent objects, but care must be taken to ensure that the tainted data is validated and sanitized appropriately to prevent potential security vulnerabilities.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `get_named_object_name` function, we will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and any operations involving tainted data.

### Taint Source and Taint Label

- **New Taint Source**: The function `get_named_object_name` is now the new taint source.
- **Taint Label**: The parameters `name_orig` (a pointer to a character buffer), `name_orig_size` (the size of the original name), `name` (a pointer to a character buffer for the output), and `name_size` (a pointer to store the size of the resulting name) are marked as tainted.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Parameter Inputs**:
   - The function takes four parameters:
     - `name_orig`: A pointer to the original name (tainted).
     - `name_orig_size`: The size of the original name (tainted).
     - `name`: A pointer to the buffer where the concatenated name will be stored (not tainted initially, but will be affected by tainted data).
     - `name_size`: A pointer to store the size of the resulting name (not tainted initially, but will be affected by tainted data).

2. **Data Aliases**:
   - `name_orig` is directly used as a pointer to the buffer containing the original name. Since it is tainted, any operations on it will also involve tainted data.
   - The `name` parameter will be populated with tainted data derived from `name_orig`.

3. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The function first checks if the combined size of `name_orig_size` and the length of `named_value_prefix` exceeds `TEE_OBJECT_ID_MAX_LEN`. If it does, it returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This check does not involve tainted data directly but ensures that the function does not proceed with invalid sizes.
   - The function then uses `TEE_MemMove` to copy the `named_value_prefix` into the `name` buffer:
     - This operation does not involve tainted data, as `named_value_prefix` is presumably a constant.
   - Next, it concatenates the provided `name_orig` into the `name` buffer using another `TEE_MemMove`:
     - This operation involves tainted data (`name_orig`), and thus the resulting `name` buffer will also contain tainted data.
   - Finally, the function sets the value pointed to by `name_size` to the total size of the concatenated name, which is also derived from tainted data.

4. **Return Value**:
   - The function returns `TEE_SUCCESS` if all operations are successful, indicating that the name has been successfully constructed.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `get_named_object_name` → `name_orig` (tainted) → `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)` (tainted operation)
  - `get_named_object_name` → `name_orig_size` (tainted) → size check (not tainted operation)
  - `get_named_object_name` → `*name_size` (derived from tainted `name_orig_size`) (tainted operation)

### Conclusion

The `get_named_object_name` function processes tainted data from the `name_orig` and `name_orig_size` parameters. It constructs a new name by concatenating a prefix with the original name, resulting in a buffer (`name`) that contains tainted data. The function ensures that the combined size does not exceed a predefined limit, which is a good practice to prevent buffer overflows. However, care must be taken to ensure that the tainted data is handled appropriately in subsequent operations to avoid potential security vulnerabilities. The taint analysis indicates that the function is designed to safely construct a named object identifier, but the integrity of the input data must be maintained throughout its usage.

Since the implementation of `TEE_MemMove` is not provided, we will analyze its role in the context of taint analysis based on its expected behavior as a memory manipulation function. We will identify the new taint source, the taint label, data aliases, and any operations involving tainted data.

### Taint Source and Taint Label

- **New Taint Source**: The function `TEE_MemMove` is now the new taint source.
- **Taint Label**: The first argument (`arg1`) of `TEE_MemMove` is marked as a taint label. This corresponds to the destination buffer where data is being copied.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Function Purpose**:
   - `TEE_MemMove` is typically used to copy a specified number of bytes from a source buffer to a destination buffer. It is expected to handle overlapping memory regions safely.

2. **Parameters**:
   - The function likely takes at least three parameters:
     - `arg1`: The destination buffer (tainted).
     - `arg2`: The source buffer (could be tainted or non-tainted).
     - `size`: The number of bytes to copy (not tainted).

3. **Data Aliases**:
   - The `arg1` parameter (destination buffer) is an alias for the memory location where data is being copied. If this buffer is derived from tainted data, it will also be considered tainted after the operation.
   - The source buffer (`arg2`) can be either tainted or non-tainted, depending on the context in which `TEE_MemMove` is called.

4. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - When `TEE_MemMove` is called in the context of the previous function (`get_named_object_name`), it performs the following operations:
     - **First Call**: `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len);`
       - Here, `name` is the destination buffer (tainted after this operation if it was previously tainted).
       - `named_value_prefix` is the source buffer (assumed to be non-tainted).
       - This operation does not introduce new taint into `name` since the source is non-tainted.
     - **Second Call**: `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size);`
       - Here, `name + pref_len` is the destination buffer (tainted).
       - `name_orig` is the source buffer (tainted).
       - This operation copies tainted data from `name_orig` into the `name` buffer, thus propagating the taint.

5. **Return Value**:
   - The return value of `TEE_MemMove` is not specified, but it typically indicates success or failure of the memory operation. If it fails, it could lead to undefined behavior or security vulnerabilities.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `TEE_MemMove` (first call) → `name` (destination, initially non-tainted, becomes tainted after this operation) ← `named_value_prefix` (source, non-tainted)
  - `TEE_MemMove` (second call) → `name + pref_len` (destination, tainted) ← `name_orig` (source, tainted)

### Conclusion

The `TEE_MemMove` function is critical in the context of memory operations involving tainted data. In the previous function (`get_named_object_name`), it is used to copy both a non-tainted prefix and a tainted original name into a destination buffer. The second call to `TEE_MemMove` propagates the taint from `name_orig` into the `name` buffer, which will be used in subsequent operations. 

While `TEE_MemMove` itself does not introduce taint, it is essential to ensure that the source and destination buffers are handled correctly to avoid security vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows or unintended data exposure. The taint analysis indicates that the integrity of the data must be maintained throughout its usage, especially when dealing with potentially untrusted input.

Based on the provided Trusted Application C code snippet, we can analyze the taint data flow originating from the `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` function. The taint source is the `cmd` parameter, which is used to determine which command to execute. The `params` array is marked as the taint label, and we will track how the tainted data flows through the function.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - `cmd` is the taint source, which is passed to the function `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint`.

2. **Tainted Parameters**:
   - `params` is marked as the taint label, which is an array of `TEE_Param` structures.

3. **Command Handling**:
   - The `cmd` parameter is used in a switch statement to determine which command to execute. The commands are:
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE`
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE`
     - `TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE`

4. **Data Flow Paths**:
   - **Case 1: TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Tainted Data Flow: 
       - `cmd` (tainted) → `read_persist_value(pt, params)`
       - `params` (tainted) is passed to `read_persist_value`.
   
   - **Case 2: TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Tainted Data Flow:
       - `cmd` (tainted) → `write_persist_value(pt, params)`
       - `params` (tainted) is passed to `write_persist_value`.
   
   - **Case 3: TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE**
     - Tainted Data Flow:
       - `cmd` (tainted) → `delete_persist_value(pt, params)`
       - `params` (tainted) is passed to `delete_persist_value`.

5. **Default Case**:
   - If `cmd` does not match any of the defined cases, it logs an error message and returns `TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`. There is no taint propagation in this case.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow for `TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE`**:
  - `cmd` (tainted) → `read_persist_value(pt, params)` → `params` (tainted)

- **Tainted Data Flow for `TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE`**:
  - `cmd` (tainted) → `write_persist_value(pt, params)` → `params` (tainted)

- **Tainted Data Flow for `TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE`**:
  - `cmd` (tainted) → `delete_persist_value(pt, params)` → `params` (tainted)

In conclusion, the tainted data flows from the `cmd` parameter to the respective command functions, carrying the taint through the `params` array. Each command function should be analyzed further to understand how they handle the tainted data.

Continuing from the previous taint analysis, we will now analyze the `write_persist_value` function. The new taint source is the `write_persist_value` function itself, and the `params` parameter is marked as the taint label. We will track the taint propagation, data aliases, and any operations performed on the tainted data.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The taint source is now the `write_persist_value` function, which is invoked with the `params` parameter marked as the taint label.

2. **Tainted Parameters**:
   - `params` is an array of `TEE_Param` structures, where:
     - `params[0]` is expected to be a memory reference input for the name.
     - `params[1]` is expected to be a memory reference input for the value.

3. **Parameter Type Check**:
   - The function checks if `pt` matches the expected parameter types (`exp_pt`). If not, it returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This check does not propagate taint but ensures that the function is called with the correct types.

4. **Data Aliases**:
   - `name_buf` is assigned from `params[0].memref.buffer`, which is tainted.
   - `value` is allocated and assigned from `params[1].memref.buffer` later in the function, which is also tainted.

5. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - **Check Validity**:
     - The function calls `check_valid_value(name_buf)`, which operates on the tainted `name_buf`. If this check fails, it logs an error and returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`.
   
   - **Overwrite Check**:
     - The function checks if `name_buf` starts with a vendor prefix or a rollback protection string. If it does, the `overwrite` flag is set to `false`. This operation does not change the taint but affects subsequent logic.

   - **Memory Allocation**:
     - `value` is allocated with `TEE_Malloc(value_sz, 0)`. If allocation fails, it returns `TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY`. The `value` variable is tainted as it will hold data from `params[1]`.

   - **Data Movement**:
     - `TEE_MemMove(value, params[1].memref.buffer, value_sz)` copies the tainted data from `params[1].memref.buffer` to `value`. This operation propagates the taint from `params[1]` to `value`.

6. **Conditional Logic**:
   - The function checks if `name_buf` starts with the vendor prefix and whether vendor creation is enabled. If not, it sets `res` to `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS` and logs an error. This does not change the taint but affects the flow of execution.
   
   - If `name_buf` does not match `BOOTFIRM_VER`, it calls `write_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, overwrite)`, propagating the taint from `name_buf` and `value` to this function.
   
   - If `name_buf` matches `BOOTFIRM_VER`, it calls `increase_boot_firmware(value, value_sz)`, propagating the taint from `value`.

7. **Memory Cleanup**:
   - `TEE_Free(value)` is called to free the allocated memory for `value`. This does not affect taint but is important for resource management.

8. **Return Value**:
   - The function returns `res`, which may indicate success or failure based on the operations performed.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `params[0].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `name_buf` (tainted)
  - `params[1].memref.buffer` (tainted) → `value` (tainted)
  - `check_valid_value(name_buf)` operates on tainted `name_buf`.
  - `TEE_MemMove(value, params[1].memref.buffer, value_sz)` propagates taint from `params[1]` to `value`.
  - `write_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, overwrite)` receives tainted `name_buf` and `value`.
  - `increase_boot_firmware(value, value_sz)` receives tainted `value`.

In conclusion, the `write_persist_value` function processes tainted data from the `params` array, propagating the taint through various operations and checks. Each operation that interacts with the tainted data should be carefully analyzed to ensure that it handles the data securely and correctly.

Continuing from the previous taint analysis, we will now analyze the `increase_boot_firmware` function. The new taint source is the `increase_boot_firmware` function itself, and the `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` parameters are marked as the taint label. We will track the taint propagation, data aliases, and any operations performed on the tainted data.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The taint source is now the `increase_boot_firmware` function, which is invoked with `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` as taint labels.

2. **Tainted Parameters**:
   - `new_ver_str` is a pointer to a character string that represents the new boot firmware version.
   - `new_ver_sz` is the size of the new version string.

3. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - **Rollback Protection Check**:
     - The function first checks if the system is rollback protected by calling `is_rollback_protected()`. This function does not interact with tainted data but is a security check.
     - If rollback protection is enabled, it then checks if the new version string is incremental by calling `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)`. This function operates on the tainted `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz`. If this check fails, it logs an error message and returns `TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED`. This operation propagates the taint from `new_ver_str`.

   - **Writing the New Version**:
     - If the checks pass, the function calls `write_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, new_ver_str, new_ver_sz, true)`. This function is responsible for writing the new boot firmware version.
     - The parameters passed to `write_value` include:
       - `BOOTFIRM_VER`: This is a constant string and not tainted.
       - `strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1`: This is the size of the constant string and not tainted.
       - `new_ver_str` (tainted): The new version string.
       - `new_ver_sz` (tainted): The size of the new version string.
       - `true`: A boolean value indicating that overwriting is allowed.

4. **Return Value**:
   - The function returns the result of the `write_value` call, which may indicate success or failure based on the operations performed.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `new_ver_str` (tainted) is passed to `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)`, which operates on tainted data.
  - If the rollback protection check passes, `new_ver_str` (tainted) and `new_ver_sz` (tainted) are passed to `write_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, new_ver_str, new_ver_sz, true)`, propagating the taint.

### Conclusion

The `increase_boot_firmware` function processes tainted data from the `new_ver_str` and `new_ver_sz` parameters. It performs checks related to rollback protection and version incrementality, both of which involve tainted data. If the checks pass, it propagates the taint to the `write_value` function, which is responsible for writing the new boot firmware version. Each operation that interacts with the tainted data should be carefully analyzed to ensure that it handles the data securely and correctly.

Continuing from the previous taint analysis, we will now analyze the `is_rollback_protected` function. The new taint source is the `is_rollback_protected` function itself, and we will track the taint propagation, data aliases, and any operations performed on the tainted data.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The taint source is now the `is_rollback_protected` function, which does not take any parameters but interacts with potentially tainted data through the `read_value` function.

2. **Tainted Parameters**:
   - The function does not have direct tainted parameters, but it interacts with the constant `ROLLBACK_PROT`, which is used in the `read_value` function.

3. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - **Reading Rollback Protection Value**:
     - The function calls `read_value(ROLLBACK_PROT, strlen(ROLLBACK_PROT) + 1, value, value_sz, &count)`. This function attempts to read the rollback protection value into the `value` buffer.
     - The parameters passed to `read_value` include:
       - `ROLLBACK_PROT`: This is a constant string that serves as the key for reading the value. It is not tainted.
       - `strlen(ROLLBACK_PROT) + 1`: This is the size of the constant string and is not tainted.
       - `value`: This is a buffer that will hold the result of the read operation. It is not tainted at this point but will contain data if the read is successful.
       - `value_sz`: This is the maximum size of the buffer and is not tainted.
       - `&count`: This is a pointer to a variable that will hold the size of the read value. It is not tainted.

   - **Result Check**:
     - After the call to `read_value`, the function checks if `res` is equal to `TEE_SUCCESS`. If it is, it logs a message indicating that rollback protection is enabled and returns `true`. This operation does not propagate taint but indicates that rollback protection is active.
     - If the read operation fails (i.e., `res` is not `TEE_SUCCESS`), the function returns `false`.

4. **Return Value**:
   - The function returns a boolean value indicating whether rollback protection is enabled.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - The function does not directly handle tainted data but relies on the `read_value` function to read the rollback protection status.
  - The `read_value` function may interact with tainted data depending on its implementation, particularly if it reads from a source that could be influenced by previous tainted operations.

### Conclusion

The `is_rollback_protected` function checks whether rollback protection is enabled by attempting to read a value associated with the `ROLLBACK_PROT` key. While this function does not directly handle tainted data, it relies on the `read_value` function, which may interact with tainted data depending on its implementation. The outcome of this function can influence the flow of execution in the `increase_boot_firmware` function, which checks the rollback protection status before proceeding with firmware updates. Each operation that interacts with the data should be carefully analyzed to ensure that it handles the data securely and correctly.

Continuing from the previous taint analysis, we will now analyze the `read_value` function. The new taint source is the `read_value` function itself, and we will track the taint propagation, data aliases, and any operations performed on the tainted data.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The taint source is now the `read_value` function, which takes several parameters, including `name`, `name_sz`, `value`, `value_sz`, and `count`.

2. **Tainted Parameters**:
   - `name`: A pointer to a character string that represents the name of the object to read. This can be tainted if it comes from a tainted source.
   - `name_sz`: The size of the name string. This is not tainted.
   - `value`: A pointer to a buffer where the read value will be stored. This is tainted if it is influenced by previous tainted data.
   - `value_sz`: The size of the buffer where the value will be stored. This is not tainted.
   - `count`: A pointer to a variable that will hold the size of the read value. This is not tainted.

3. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - **Get Named Object Name**:
     - The function calls `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)`. This function attempts to derive the full name of the object based on the provided `name`.
     - If `name` is tainted, it propagates the taint to the `name_full` variable if the function succeeds. If it fails, it returns the error code.

   - **Open Persistent Object**:
     - The function calls `TEE_OpenPersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, &h)`. This function attempts to open a persistent object using the full name derived from the previous step.
     - If `name_full` is tainted, it propagates the taint to the object handle `h` if the operation succeeds. If it fails, it logs an error message and returns the error code.

   - **Read Object Data**:
     - The function calls `TEE_ReadObjectData(h, value, value_sz, count)`. This function attempts to read data from the opened object into the `value` buffer.
     - If `value` is tainted, the taint propagates from `value` to the data read from the object. If the read operation fails, it logs an error message.

   - **Close Object**:
     - The function calls `TEE_CloseObject(h)` to close the object handle. This operation does not affect taint but is important for resource management.

4. **Return Value**:
   - The function returns the result of the read operation, which may indicate success or failure based on the operations performed.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `name` (tainted) is passed to `get_named_object_name`, which may propagate taint to `name_full`.
  - If `name_full` is derived from a tainted `name`, it is used in `TEE_OpenPersistentObject`, which may propagate taint to the object handle `h`.
  - If the object is successfully opened, `TEE_ReadObjectData(h, value, value_sz, count)` reads data into `value`, propagating the taint from `value` to the data read from the object.

### Conclusion

The `read_value` function reads a value associated with a given name from persistent storage. It interacts with potentially tainted data through the `name` and `value` parameters. The function performs several operations that can propagate taint, including deriving the full object name, opening the persistent object, and reading data into the `value` buffer. Each operation that interacts with the data should be carefully analyzed to ensure that it handles the data securely and correctly. The taint analysis indicates that if the `name` parameter is tainted, the data read into `value` will also be tainted, which can have implications for security and data integrity.

Continuing from the previous taint analysis, we will now analyze the `get_named_object_name` function. The new taint source is the `get_named_object_name` function itself, and we will track the taint propagation, data aliases, and any operations performed on the tainted data.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The taint source is now the `get_named_object_name` function, which takes several parameters, including `name_orig`, `name_orig_size`, `name`, and `name_size`.

2. **Tainted Parameters**:
   - `name_orig`: A pointer to a character string that represents the original name of the object. This can be tainted if it comes from a tainted source.
   - `name_orig_size`: The size of the original name string. This is not tainted.
   - `name`: A pointer to a buffer where the concatenated name will be stored. This is tainted if it is influenced by previous tainted data.
   - `name_size`: A pointer to a variable that will hold the size of the concatenated name. This is not tainted.

3. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - **Parameter Size Check**:
     - The function first checks if the combined size of `name_orig_size` and the length of `named_value_prefix` exceeds `TEE_OBJECT_ID_MAX_LEN`. If it does, it returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This check does not propagate taint but ensures that the function is called with valid sizes.

   - **Memory Move Operations**:
     - The function uses `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len)` to copy the prefix into the `name` buffer. This operation does not involve tainted data since `named_value_prefix` is a constant.
     - The function then uses `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)` to concatenate the original name to the end of the prefix. If `name_orig` is tainted, this operation propagates the taint to the `name` buffer.

   - **Size Assignment**:
     - The function assigns the total size of the concatenated name to `*name_size`. This operation does not affect taint.

4. **Return Value**:
   - The function returns `TEE_SUCCESS` if the operations are successful, indicating that the name has been constructed correctly.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - `name_orig` (tainted) is passed to `get_named_object_name`.
  - If `name_orig` is tainted, the operation `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)` propagates the taint to the `name` buffer.
  - The resulting `name` buffer will be tainted if it includes tainted data from `name_orig`.

### Conclusion

The `get_named_object_name` function constructs a full object name by concatenating a predefined prefix with the original name provided in `name_orig`. If `name_orig` is tainted, the resulting `name` buffer will also be tainted due to the memory move operation. This taint propagation is crucial as it affects subsequent operations that use the `name` buffer, such as opening a persistent object in the `read_value` function. Each operation that interacts with the data should be carefully analyzed to ensure that it handles the data securely and correctly, especially when tainted data is involved.

Since the implementation of `TEE_MemMove` is not provided, we will analyze its role in the context of taint propagation based on its expected behavior as a memory manipulation function. The `TEE_MemMove` function is typically used to copy a specified number of bytes from one memory location to another, handling potential overlaps in memory regions.

### Taint Analysis of `TEE_MemMove`

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The taint source is now the `TEE_MemMove` function itself, which is invoked in the `get_named_object_name` function.

2. **Tainted Parameters**:
   - The parameters for `TEE_MemMove` are:
     - `arg1`: The destination buffer where data will be copied.
     - `arg2`: The source buffer from which data will be copied. This is marked as a taint label.

3. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - **Memory Copy**:
     - The operation `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len)` copies the contents of `named_value_prefix` (which is not tainted) into the `name` buffer. This operation does not propagate taint since the source is a constant.
     - The operation `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)` copies the contents of `name_orig` into the `name` buffer starting at the position after the prefix. If `name_orig` is tainted, this operation propagates the taint to the `name` buffer.

4. **Return Value**:
   - The return value of `TEE_MemMove` is typically void, meaning it does not return a status code. However, the success of the operation can be inferred from the context in which it is used.

### Summary of Tainted Data Flows

- **Tainted Data Flow**:
  - When `TEE_MemMove` is called with `name_orig` as the source, if `name_orig` is tainted, the taint propagates to the `name` buffer.
  - The resulting `name` buffer will be tainted if it includes tainted data from `name_orig`.

### Conclusion

The `TEE_MemMove` function is critical in the context of taint analysis as it directly influences the propagation of taint between memory buffers. In the `get_named_object_name` function, the use of `TEE_MemMove` to copy data from `name_orig` to `name` means that if `name_orig` is tainted, the resulting `name` will also be tainted. This taint propagation is significant for subsequent operations that utilize the `name` buffer, such as opening a persistent object in the `read_value` function. Each operation that interacts with the data should be carefully analyzed to ensure that it handles the data securely and correctly, especially when tainted data is involved. 

In summary, the analysis of `TEE_MemMove` highlights the importance of understanding how memory operations can propagate taint, which is crucial for maintaining data integrity and security in the application.

Based on the provided Trusted Application C code snippet, we can analyze the data flow with respect to the taint source and the taint label. The taint source is the `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` function, and the taint label is associated with the `params` parameter.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` is invoked with parameters:
     - `cmd`: Command identifier (uint32_t)
     - `pt`: Parameter type (uint32_t)
     - `params`: Array of TEE_Param structures (taint label)

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The `params` parameter is marked as tainted data. The operations that involve this tainted data are as follows:

3. **Command Handling**:
   - The function uses a switch statement to handle different command IDs:
     - **Case `TA_FIOVB_CMD_READ_PERSIST_VALUE`**:
       - Calls `read_persist_value(pt, params)`.
       - **Data Flow**: 
         - Tainted data from `params` is passed to `read_persist_value`.
     - **Case `TA_FIOVB_CMD_WRITE_PERSIST_VALUE`**:
       - Calls `write_persist_value(pt, params)`.
       - **Data Flow**: 
         - Tainted data from `params` is passed to `write_persist_value`.
     - **Case `TA_FIOVB_CMD_DELETE_PERSIST_VALUE`**:
       - Calls `delete_persist_value(pt, params)`.
       - **Data Flow**: 
         - Tainted data from `params` is passed to `delete_persist_value`.
     - **Default Case**:
       - Logs an error message and returns `TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`.
       - **Data Flow**: 
         - No tainted data is processed in this case.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Flow 1**: 
  - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` → `read_persist_value(pt, params)` (tainted data from `params`)

- **Flow 2**: 
  - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` → `write_persist_value(pt, params)` (tainted data from `params`)

- **Flow 3**: 
  - `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint` → `delete_persist_value(pt, params)` (tainted data from `params`)

### Conclusion
The `params` parameter is the source of tainted data that flows into three different functions based on the command ID. Each of these functions (`read_persist_value`, `write_persist_value`, and `delete_persist_value`) will need to be analyzed further to understand how they handle the tainted data.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `write_persist_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, which is now `write_persist_value`, and the taint label associated with the `params` parameter. We will also analyze data aliases and tainted data operations.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The new taint source is `write_persist_value`, which is invoked from `TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint`.
   - The taint label is associated with the `params` parameter.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The `params` parameter is used to extract data that is potentially tainted. The operations involving this tainted data are as follows:

3. **Parameter Validation**:
   - The function checks if the `pt` parameter matches the expected parameter types (`exp_pt`).
   - If not, it returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This does not involve tainted data.

4. **Extracting Tainted Data**:
   - `name_buf` is assigned from `params[0].memref.buffer`, which is tainted.
   - `name_buf_sz` is assigned from `params[0].memref.size`, which is not tainted but is derived from tainted data.

5. **Validation of Tainted Data**:
   - The function calls `check_valid_value(name_buf)`, which uses the tainted `name_buf`.
   - If this check fails, it logs an error and returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`.

6. **Overwrite Protection**:
   - The function checks if `name_buf` starts with a vendor prefix or a rollback protection string. If so, it sets `overwrite` to `false`.
   - This operation does not modify tainted data but checks its content.

7. **Memory Allocation for Value**:
   - `value_sz` is assigned from `params[1].memref.size`, which is also derived from tainted data.
   - `value` is allocated using `TEE_Malloc(value_sz, 0)`. If allocation fails, it returns `TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY`.

8. **Copying Tainted Data**:
   - The function uses `TEE_MemMove(value, params[1].memref.buffer, value_sz)` to copy the tainted data from `params[1].memref.buffer` to `value`.
   - This operation propagates the taint from `params[1]` to `value`.

9. **Conditional Logic Based on Tainted Data**:
   - The function checks if `name_buf` starts with the vendor prefix and whether `CFG_FIOVB_VENDOR_CREATE` is enabled. If not, it logs an error and sets `res` to `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`.
   - If `name_buf` does not match `BOOTFIRM_VER`, it calls `write_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, overwrite)`, propagating tainted data to this function.
   - If it matches, it calls `increase_boot_firmware(value, value_sz)`, also propagating tainted data.

10. **Freeing Allocated Memory**:
    - The function calls `TEE_Free(value)` to free the allocated memory, which does not affect taint.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Flow 1**: 
  - `write_persist_value` → `check_valid_value(name_buf)` (tainted data from `params[0].memref.buffer`)

- **Flow 2**: 
  - `write_persist_value` → `TEE_MemMove(value, params[1].memref.buffer, value_sz)` (tainted data from `params[1].memref.buffer`)

- **Flow 3**: 
  - `write_persist_value` → `write_value(name_buf, name_buf_sz, value, value_sz, overwrite)` (tainted data from `name_buf` and `value`)

- **Flow 4**: 
  - `write_persist_value` → `increase_boot_firmware(value, value_sz)` (tainted data from `value`)

### Conclusion
The `write_persist_value` function processes tainted data from the `params` parameter, propagating it through various checks and operations. The taint flows into memory allocation, data copying, and further function calls, which should be analyzed for potential vulnerabilities or improper handling of tainted data.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `increase_boot_firmware` function, we will identify the new taint source, which is now `increase_boot_firmware`, and the taint label associated with the `new_ver_str` parameter. We will also analyze data aliases and tainted data operations.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The new taint source is `increase_boot_firmware`, which is invoked from `write_persist_value`.
   - The taint label is associated with the `new_ver_str` parameter, which is derived from the tainted `value` in `write_persist_value`.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The `new_ver_str` parameter is tainted data that is passed into the `increase_boot_firmware` function. The operations involving this tainted data are as follows:

3. **Rollback Protection Check**:
   - The function first checks if the system is rollback protected by calling `is_rollback_protected()`. This function does not involve tainted data.
   - It then checks if the new version string is incremental by calling `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)`, which uses the tainted `new_ver_str`.
   - If the rollback protection is active and the version is not incremental, it logs an error message and returns `TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED`. This operation involves tainted data but does not modify it.

4. **Writing the New Version**:
   - If the checks pass, the function calls `write_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, new_ver_str, new_ver_sz, true)`.
   - This operation propagates the taint from `new_ver_str` to the `write_value` function, along with the constant `BOOTFIRM_VER` and its length.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Flow 1**: 
  - `increase_boot_firmware` → `is_version_incremental(new_ver_str, new_ver_sz)` (tainted data from `new_ver_str`)

- **Flow 2**: 
  - `increase_boot_firmware` → `write_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, new_ver_str, new_ver_sz, true)` (tainted data from `new_ver_str`)

### Conclusion
The `increase_boot_firmware` function processes tainted data from the `new_ver_str` parameter, which is derived from the `params` parameter in `write_persist_value`. The taint flows into a rollback protection check and a subsequent call to `write_value`, which should be analyzed for proper handling of tainted data. The function ensures that the firmware version update adheres to certain conditions, but the tainted data must be carefully managed to prevent unauthorized modifications. Further analysis of the `write_value` function is necessary to understand how it handles the tainted data.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `is_version_incremental` function, we will identify the new taint source, which is now `is_version_incremental`, and the taint label associated with the `new_ver_str` parameter. We will also analyze data aliases and tainted data operations.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The new taint source is `is_version_incremental`, which is invoked from `increase_boot_firmware`.
   - The taint label is associated with the `new_ver_str` parameter, which is derived from the tainted `value` in `write_persist_value`.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The `new_ver_str` parameter is tainted data that is passed into the `is_version_incremental` function. The operations involving this tainted data are as follows:

3. **Reading Current Version**:
   - The function calls `read_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, value, MAX_SIMPLE_VALUE_SIZE, &count)`.
   - This operation attempts to read the current boot firmware version into the `value` buffer. The result of this operation is stored in `res`.
   - If `res` equals `TEE_ERROR_ITEM_NOT_FOUND`, it indicates that the current version is not found, and the function logs a message and returns `true`. This does not involve tainted data.

4. **Processing Current and New Versions**:
   - If `res` equals `TEE_SUCCESS`, the function converts the `value` (current version) and `new_ver_str` (new version) from strings to unsigned long integers using `strtoul`.
   - The conversion of `new_ver_str` involves tainted data, which is now being processed.
   - The function logs the current and new version numbers for debugging purposes.

5. **Comparison of Versions**:
   - The function checks if `new_ver` is greater than or equal to `current_ver`. If this condition is met, it returns `true`, indicating that the new version is incremental.
   - If the condition is not met, it returns `false`.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Flow 1**: 
  - `is_version_incremental` → `read_value(BOOTFIRM_VER, strlen(BOOTFIRM_VER) + 1, value, MAX_SIMPLE_VALUE_SIZE, &count)` (no tainted data involved)

- **Flow 2**: 
  - `is_version_incremental` → `strtoul(new_ver_str, NULL, 10)` (tainted data from `new_ver_str`)

- **Flow 3**: 
  - `is_version_incremental` → Comparison of `new_ver` and `current_ver` (tainted data indirectly involved in the comparison)

### Conclusion
The `is_version_incremental` function processes tainted data from the `new_ver_str` parameter, which is derived from the `params` parameter in `write_persist_value`. The taint flows into the conversion of the new version string to an integer and is used in a comparison with the current version. The function ensures that the new version is valid and incremental before allowing the firmware update. Further analysis of the `read_value` function is necessary to understand how it handles the current version and whether it introduces any vulnerabilities related to tainted data.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `read_value` function, we will identify the new taint source, which is now `read_value`, and the taint label associated with the `name` parameter. We will also analyze data aliases and tainted data operations.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The new taint source is `read_value`, which is invoked from `is_version_incremental`.
   - The taint label is associated with the `name` parameter, which is derived from the constant `BOOTFIRM_VER` in the context of the previous function.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The `name` parameter is not tainted in the traditional sense, as it is a constant string (`BOOTFIRM_VER`). However, it is important to note that the function operates on this string to access potentially sensitive data.

3. **Getting the Full Object Name**:
   - The function calls `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)`.
   - This operation attempts to derive the full name of the object based on the provided `name`. The result is stored in `name_full`.
   - If this operation fails (i.e., `res` is non-zero), the function returns the error code. This does not involve tainted data.

4. **Opening the Persistent Object**:
   - The function calls `TEE_OpenPersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, &h)`.
   - This operation attempts to open a persistent object in the secure storage using the full name derived earlier. If it fails, it logs an error message and returns the error code. This operation does not involve tainted data.

5. **Reading Object Data**:
   - The function calls `TEE_ReadObjectData(h, value, value_sz, count)`.
   - This operation reads data from the opened persistent object into the `value` buffer. The `value` buffer is where the tainted data from `write_persist_value` will eventually be stored.
   - If this operation fails, it logs an error message. The `value` buffer is tainted as it is derived from the `params` parameter in `write_persist_value`.

6. **Closing the Object**:
   - The function calls `TEE_CloseObject(h)` to close the persistent object handle. This operation does not affect taint.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Flow 1**: 
  - `read_value` → `get_named_object_name(name, name_sz, name_full, &name_full_sz)` (no tainted data involved)

- **Flow 2**: 
  - `read_value` → `TEE_OpenPersistentObject(storageid, name_full, name_full_sz, flags, &h)` (no tainted data involved)

- **Flow 3**: 
  - `read_value` → `TEE_ReadObjectData(h, value, value_sz, count)` (tainted data from `value`, which is derived from `params` in `write_persist_value`)

- **Flow 4**: 
  - `read_value` → `TEE_CloseObject(h)` (no tainted data involved)

### Conclusion
The `read_value` function interacts with the secure storage to retrieve the current boot firmware version. While the `name` parameter itself is not tainted, the `value` buffer is where the tainted data from the previous function (`write_persist_value`) is stored. The function performs several operations to access the persistent object and read its data, which must be carefully managed to ensure that sensitive information is handled securely. Further analysis of the `TEE_ReadObjectData` function is necessary to understand how it manages the data read into the `value` buffer and whether it introduces any vulnerabilities related to tainted data.

Continuing the taint analysis for the `get_named_object_name` function, we will identify the new taint source, which is now `get_named_object_name`, and the taint label associated with the `name_orig` parameter. We will also analyze data aliases and tainted data operations.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The new taint source is `get_named_object_name`, which is invoked from `read_value`.
   - The taint label is associated with the `name_orig` parameter, which is derived from the constant `BOOTFIRM_VER` in the context of the previous function.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The `name_orig` parameter is not tainted in the traditional sense, as it is a constant string (`BOOTFIRM_VER`). However, it is important to note that the function operates on this string to derive a new object name.

3. **Prefix Length Calculation**:
   - The function calculates the length of the prefix string `named_value_prefix` using `strlen(named_value_prefix)`. This operation does not involve tainted data.

4. **Parameter Size Check**:
   - The function checks if the combined size of `name_orig` and the prefix exceeds the maximum allowed length (`TEE_OBJECT_ID_MAX_LEN`). If it does, it returns `TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS`. This operation does not involve tainted data.

5. **Constructing the Full Object Name**:
   - The function uses `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len)` to copy the prefix into the `name` buffer.
   - It then concatenates the provided object name by using `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)`. This operation copies the contents of `name_orig` into the `name` buffer after the prefix.
   - Both of these operations involve the `name` buffer, which will ultimately be used to access the persistent object in the secure storage.

6. **Setting the Output Size**:
   - The function sets the output size of the constructed name in `*name_size`, which is the sum of the prefix length and the original name size.

7. **Return Success**:
   - The function returns `TEE_SUCCESS` if all operations are successful.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Flow 1**: 
  - `get_named_object_name` → `strlen(named_value_prefix)` (no tainted data involved)

- **Flow 2**: 
  - `get_named_object_name` → `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len)` (no tainted data involved)

- **Flow 3**: 
  - `get_named_object_name` → `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)` (no tainted data involved, but constructs the name for further use)

- **Flow 4**: 
  - `get_named_object_name` → `*name_size = name_orig_size + pref_len` (no tainted data involved)

### Conclusion
The `get_named_object_name` function constructs a full object name by concatenating a prefix with the provided name. While the `name_orig` parameter itself is not tainted, it is derived from the constant `BOOTFIRM_VER`, which is used to access sensitive data in the secure storage. The function performs necessary checks and constructs the name without introducing any new taint. The constructed name will be used in subsequent operations to access the persistent object, and it is crucial to ensure that the prefix and the original name are handled securely. Further analysis of how the constructed name is used in the `read_value` function is necessary to ensure that there are no vulnerabilities related to the access of sensitive data.

Since the implementation of `TEE_MemMove` is not provided, we will analyze its role in the context of the previous functions and how it interacts with tainted data. We will treat `TEE_MemMove` as a potential taint propagation point and analyze its parameters, particularly focusing on the `arg2` parameter, which corresponds to the source buffer being copied.

### Data Flow Analysis

1. **Taint Source**:
   - The new taint source is `TEE_MemMove`, which is invoked in multiple places in the previous functions.
   - The taint label is associated with the `arg2` parameter, which represents the source buffer being copied.

2. **Tainted Data Operations**:
   - The `TEE_MemMove` function is used to copy data from one memory location to another. The parameters involved in the calls to `TEE_MemMove` in the previous functions are as follows:

   - **In `get_named_object_name`**:
     - **First Call**: 
       - `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len)`
       - Here, `arg1` is the destination buffer (`name`), and `arg2` is the source buffer (`named_value_prefix`). This operation does not involve tainted data.
     - **Second Call**: 
       - `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)`
       - In this case, `arg1` is the destination buffer (`name + pref_len`), and `arg2` is the source buffer (`name_orig`). The `name_orig` parameter is derived from the constant `BOOTFIRM_VER`, which is not tainted, but it is important to note that this operation constructs the full object name.

   - **In `read_value`**:
     - The `TEE_MemMove` function is not directly called in `read_value`, but it is important to note that the `value` buffer, which is passed to `TEE_ReadObjectData`, is where the tainted data from `write_persist_value` will be stored. The `value` buffer is tainted as it is derived from the `params` parameter in `write_persist_value`.

3. **Taint Propagation**:
   - The `TEE_MemMove` function is responsible for copying data from the source buffer to the destination buffer. If the source buffer (`arg2`) contains tainted data, the destination buffer will also become tainted after the operation.
   - In the context of the previous functions, the `name_orig` parameter is not tainted, but it is important to ensure that any future use of the `name` buffer does not inadvertently expose sensitive data.

### Summary of Data Flows

- **Flow 1**: 
  - `TEE_MemMove(name, named_value_prefix, pref_len)` (no tainted data involved)

- **Flow 2**: 
  - `TEE_MemMove(name + pref_len, name_orig, name_orig_size)` (no tainted data involved, but constructs the name for further use)

### Conclusion
The `TEE_MemMove` function is a critical operation for copying data between buffers. In the context of the previous functions, it is used to construct the full object name without introducing taint, as the source buffers are not tainted. However, it is essential to monitor how the destination buffers are used in subsequent operations, especially when they may interact with sensitive data. The taint analysis should continue to track the flow of data through the system to ensure that no vulnerabilities are introduced through improper handling of memory operations. Further analysis of the `TEE_ReadObjectData` function is necessary to understand how it manages the data read into the `value` buffer and whether it introduces any vulnerabilities related to tainted data.